Pace Law Review
Volume 33
Issue 2 Spring 2013

Article 2

April 2013

Adjudicating Sex Crimes as Mental Disease
Melissa Hamilton
University of Houston Law Center

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Melissa Hamilton, Adjudicating Sex Crimes as Mental Disease, 33 Pace L. Rev. 536 (2013)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/2
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

ADJUDICATING S EX CRIMES AS MENTAL DISEASE

7/26/2013 4:32 PM

Adjudicating Sex Crimes as Mental
Disease
Melissa Hamilton*
I.

Introduction

Sexual deviance is a topic of virtually infinite allure, captivating the
media’s attention and causing widespread apprehension both inside the
criminal justice system and in the public-at-large. 1 With the recent
foment of fear about sexually violent predators, lawmakers have sought
ways to reduce the perceived risk to public safety and to calm their
constituents’ concerns. The prevailing strategy is a medicalization of
social control in which officials employ certain psychiatric illnesses
related to unusual sexual preferences to justify a host of civil and
criminal laws in managing sex offender populations. In psychiatry’s
nosology—the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(“DSM”)2—mental disorders of sexual deviance are called paraphilias.
Paraphilias are particularly salient in being considered relatively
synonymous with sex-based crimes. 3 In slang, paraphilias are bizarre,
kinky, or weird sex, 4 while in legal terms they are generally considered
sexual perversions or deviances.5 The clinical DSM characterization of
paraphilias delineates sexual fantasies or behaviors that involve unusual
objects, activities, or situations and are usually accompanied by

* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center; J.D.;
Ph.D., The University of Texas at Austin. Much appreciation to Cynthia Lee, Ruth Jones,
and Carissa Hessick for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft.
1. Richard L. Lippke, Why Sex (Offending) is Different, 30 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 151,
151 (2011) (“[T]he public has some kind of peculiar hang-up about crimes involving
sex.”).
2. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS DSM-IV-TR (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
3. ANIL AGGRAWAL, FORENSIC AND MEDICO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF SEXUAL CRIMES
AND UNUSUAL SEXUAL PRACTICES 2 (2009) (frequently illegal, paraphilias are uniquely
attractive).
4. See id. at 4.
5. Fabian M. Saleh et al., The Management of Sex Offenders: Perspectives for
Psychiatry, 18 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 359, 366 (2010).
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significant distress or impairment in social functioning. 6 A few of the
current DSM paraphilias are pedophilia, sexual sadism and masochism,
exhibitionism, voyeurism, and the polymorphous category of paraphilia
not otherwise specified.7
The attribution of a sex-based mental disorder can have significant
legal consequences in providing the government a justification to
infringe upon a defendant’s interests in liberty and privacy. For example,
studies of factors leading to forensic recommendations in favor of sexual
predator civil commitment consistently show that instances involving a
paraphilia diagnosis are significant predictors of outcomes in favor of
involuntary commitment.8 In criminal cases, a paraphilia diagnosis has
been employed for various purposes. Disorders of sexual deviance are
cited to deny bail pending trial.9 There may be sentencing repercussions
from the presence of paraphilic disorder to justify a prison sentence as
opposed to community supervision10 and, as an aggravating factor, to
support a longer term of imprisonment.11 Judges in many cases have
ruled that a pedophilia diagnosis, for example, warranted extended
sentences, as it was relevant to protecting society.12 United States
Sentencing Commission members and expert witnesses called before a
public hearing in 2012 about the appropriateness of lengthy sentences for
child sexual exploitation offenders evidently agree, since at least a dozen
times they cited the prevalence of paraphilias in the offender group. 13
6. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, at 535.
7. Id.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 116-29.
9. E.g., United States v. Blauvelt, No. WDQ-08-0269, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
87060, at *15–19 (D. Md. Oct. 28, 2008); United States v. Colin, No. 1:07-CR-512, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91409, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2007); United States v. Coffey, No.
5:01-CR-268, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10452, at *20 (N.D.N.Y. July 24, 2001); State v.
Enrique T., 937 N.Y.S.2d 203, 207-08 (App. Div. 2012).
10. State v. Lottie, No. 93050, 2010 WL 2333052, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 10,
2010).
11. E.g., United States v. Mantanes, 632 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2011); Wells v.
United States, No. 3:07cv1740, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5332, at *38 n.10 (D. Conn. Jan.
25, 2010); People v. Myers, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11484, at *3 (Ct. App. Dec.
21, 2006).
12. E.g., United States v. Hammonds, No. 10-6498, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7099, at
*8 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2012); United States v. Garnette, 474 F.3d 1057, 1061 (8th Cir.
2007); State v. Yingling, No. 2-307 / 11-1537, 2012 Iowa App. LEXIS 329, at *2 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2012); Wisconsin v. Roders, Nos. 84-1222-CR and 84-1223-CR, 1985 Wisc.
App. LEXIS 3472, at *14 (Ct. App. June 12, 1985).
13. Child Pornography Offenses: Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing
Comm’n
2,
112-13,
128,
169,
236
(2012),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20
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Paraphilias have been consequential in death penalty sentencing
hearings, offered by the prosecution as an aggravating factor suggesting
the need for complete incapacitation.14 Parole decisions can be impacted,
too. A paraphilia diagnosis has encouraged officials to mandate mental
health treatment as a condition of parole, 15 postpone parole release,16 or
entirely deny parole. 17
On the other hand, defense counsel have cited mental disorders of
sexual deviance as benefiting their clients’ legal positions.
Characterizing the existence of a paraphilia as a mitigating factor,
defendants have argued that a lesser sentence is justified18 or that a death
sentence is undeserved in capital cases. 19 They have also offered
paraphilia diagnoses to support incompetency20 or to support an insanity
defense.21
120215-16/Hearing_Transcript_20120215.pdf.
14. Lynch v. Hudson, No. 2:07-cv-948, 2011 WL 4537890, at *76 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
28, 2011) (noting prosecutor argued defendant deserved death for his status as a
pedophile); State v. Kleypas, 40 P.3d 139, 274-76 (Kan. 2001) (while defendant argued
mitigating, prosecutor countered, asserting it meant defendant would pose a risk in prison
to weaker male inmates).
15. People v. Holmgren, No. B205684, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9559, at *3–
4 (Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2008) (pedophilia); People v. Johnson, No. B196843, 2008 Cal.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 817, at *2 (Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2008) (paraphilia not otherwise
specified).
16. E.g., Hess v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 514 F.3d 909, 915 (9th
Cir. 2008) (pedophilia); McClure v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 237 P.3d
879, 881 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (rape paraphilia); Davis v. Lampert, 25 P.3d 408, 411 (Or.
Ct. App. 2001) (exhibitionism and voyeurism).
17. E.g., Ehler v. Nooth, 384 F. App’x 690, 691 (9th Cir. 2010); In re Cody, No.
D058970, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7308, at *4 (Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2011);
McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 790 A.2d 974 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
18. United States v. Freeman, 194 F. App’x 777, 779 (11th Cir. 2006) (paraphilia
involving sexual interest in children); United States v. Roderick, No. 2:10-CR-741-DCN,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81086, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2011); United States v. Williams,
No. ACM 35350, 2004 CCA LEXIS 269, at *9–10 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2004)
(exhibitionism, frotteurism).
19. Many cases involve sexual sadism. E.g., Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308,
1316 (11th Cir. 2006); State v. Smith, 159 P.3d 531, 542 (Ariz. 2007); Ault v. State, 53
So. 3d 175, 193 (Fla. 2010) (ruling pedophilia mitigating in compelling the defendant to
kidnap); Brant v. State, 21 So. 3d 1276, 1283 (Fla. 2009); see also People v. Runge, 917
N.E.2d 940, 986 (Ill. 2009) (ruling sexual sadism does not render death sentence cruel
and unusual punishment).
20. State v. Ross, 873 A.2d 131, 146 (Conn. 2005) (sexual sadism); State v.
Bordelon, 2007-0525, p. 19 (La. 10/16/09); 33 So.3d 842, 855 (sexual sadism).
21. E.g., Moorman v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (pedophilia);
United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (pedophilia); see also
Cowley v. Stricklin, 929 F.2d 640, 643 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding constitutional error in
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The psychiatric diseases of the paraphilias are now entrenched in
the law in decisions concerning culpability, desert, and risk. Though, as
the foregoing cases suggest, it is a tough balancing act, considering the
existence of psychiatric illness suggests less responsibility, while at the
same time implying a greater risk of future dangerousness. 22 To better
navigate this conundrum, the law has drawn on the psychiatric sciences.
Part II of this Article outlines a basic need for law and science to serve
each other even though they may not share objectives. With respect to
the advent of new laws to control sex offenders, a law-psychiatry
interface is utilized, whereby sexual offenders diagnosed with mental
disorders can face negative legal consequences. Part III shows how
diagnostic criteria have been interpreted to allow the use of sexual
offenses as a proxy to diagnose mental disorder. The problem is that
psychiatric diseases do not commit sex crimes—people do.23 This Part
also outlines reasons why the mutually reinforcing nature of this
professional combination ignores substantial evidence that the DSMbased disorders of sexual deviance suffer substantial empirical and
normative flaws. Part IV argues that the conflation of sexual crimes with
mental illness is largely pretextual to serve the interests of criminal
justice officials in justifying preventive detention. Overall, the
paraphilias are a poor fit to answer legal questions about whether
infringement upon substantial personal interests is lawfully appropriate.
A review of case law, though, shows that legal challenges to the use of
paraphilias for case adjudications, whether using the Frye/Daubert
thresholds for the admissibility of scientific evidence or due process
standards, have generally been unsuccessful. Finally, Part V provides
concluding remarks, including a warning that a law-psychiatry interface
can in a similar manner be exploited to apply to virtually any type of
deviance, simply by linking it to mental disease.

not providing court-appointed experts to assist an insanity defense based on sexual
sadism).
22. See Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 695 (4th Cir. 2001) (denying ineffective
assistance claim for failing to offer evidence of sexual sadism, noting that despite
“alleged mitigation value,” the disorder is “repellent”).
23. Gregory DeClue, Paraphilia NOS (Nonconsenting) and Antisocial Personality
Disorder, 34 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 495, 498 (2006).
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Sex Offender Policy Driven by the Specter of Mental Disease

The law often seeks input from the sciences. 24 This inquiry can be
mutually beneficial. Legal practitioners seek information from scientists
to address relevant legal issues, while scientists gain tangible and
practical benefits when their services and research are sought. Both
disciplines, in some sense, seek consensus. For law, that consensus often
is in the form of a normative inquiry with an ontological assumption that
a definitive answer can be ascertained. 25 For science, it is the
collaborative establishment of testable theories to explain or predict the
phenomenon at issue.26 Yet the law-science interface can be problematic
considering that their epistemological foundations and pragmatic goals
differ.27 From the epistemic perspective, “[l]aw is a discipline of the
humanities, based upon beliefs, arguments, and deduction. Truth, in law,
is derived . . . by persuasion and argument.”28 Science, though, seeks
truth through observable phenomena, utilizing empiricism, observation,
and experimentation. 29 The goals of the disciplines are often
incongruous. The law’s normative inquiry is inherently value-laden and
targeted toward a subjectively-derived notion of achieving justice. 30
Science’s heuristic method seeks a more objectively-derived
knowledge. 31 These disciplinary differences are so structurally
fundamental that it appears unnecessary to recognize these corollaries:
(1) science cannot commandeer the law’s normative inquiry, and (2) the
law should not undermine the integrity of science. 32 Nonetheless, both
rules are severely tested in the high profile area of sex offender policy,
24. Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 366 (noting legal theory must evolve and be
informed by discoveries in science and medicine).
25. Steven K. Erickson, The Myth of Mental Disorder: Transsubstantive Behavior
and Taxometric Psychiatry, 41 AKRON L. REV. 67, 78 (2008).
26. See generally Michael Friedman, Explanation and Scientific Understanding, 71
J. PHIL. 5 (1974).
27. Erickson, supra note 25, at 78 (“The goals of each discipline [law and science]
are inconsistent even when they appear identical because of their different approaches to
understanding the problem to begin with.”); Robert A. Prentky et al., Sexually Violent
Predators in the Courtroom: Science on Trial, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 357, 359–
60 (2008) (“In any context, the science-law interface must negotiate the potential for
breakdown in three basic areas: translation, boundaries, and evaluation.”).
28. Erickson, supra note 25, at 71.
29. Lee Epstein & Gary King, Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal
Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (2002).
30. Prentky et al., supra note 27, at 359–60.
31. Erickson, supra note 25, at 78; Prentky et al., supra note 27, at 360.
32. Erickson, supra note 25, at 78.
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which has evolved so as to be dependent on the intersection between law
and the science of psychiatry.
A.

Medicalization of Social Control

Sex crimes remain a prominent legal and public issue as society
continues to be in the grip of a moral panic about sexual offenders. 33 The
media and lawmakers have reified the image of the sexually violent
predator (the “SVP”). 34 Other works have explained why this image is
mostly mythical and the SVP is, in reality, a socio-legal construct.35 A
result of the hype has been a plethora of new laws, as well as a
strengthening of existing legal frameworks, specifically for sexual
offenses (generally referred to herein as “SVP laws”). 36 These employ a
penological mixture of punishment, incapacitation, and treatment. The
consequences of these unique laws targeting sex-based offenses and
sexual offenders include denying bail, adding conditions for supervised
release, lengthening sentences, restricting parole, imposing sex offender
registry requirements and residency restrictions, and seeking sex
offender civil commitments. 37 The foregoing necessarily involve civil
rights interests because they infringe upon liberty and privacy, 38 thereby
rendering SVP laws as a human rights issue deserving attention and
vigilance.39
Policy analysts have offered explanations for the unique reaction to
sex offenders. There are concerns about the connection between
particularly harmful behaviors against vulnerable groups—here being
women and children—and the presumption of long-term propensity for

33. Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect Science:
Future Dangerousness Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 TEMPLE L. REV. 697,
700–01 (2011).
34. Id.
35. Id.; Michael Petrunik et al., American and Canadian Approaches to Sex
Offenders: A Study of the Politics of Dangerousness, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 111 (2008).
36. For examples of such new and existing laws, see Hamilton, supra note 33, at
702–07.
37. TRACY VELÁZQUEZ, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PURSUIT OF SAFETY: SEX
OFFENDER POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2008), available at
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Sex_offender_policy_with_a
ppendices_final.pdf.
38. Hamilton, supra note 33, at 702–07.
39. Charles Moser & Peggy J. Kleinplatz, DSM-IV-TR and the Paraphilias: An
Argument for Removal, 17 J. PSYCHOL. & HUM. SEXUALITY 91, 93 (2006).
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sexual recidivism. 40 Together, these fears have fostered an idiosyncratic
model of criminal justice that trades the normal foundation of
proportionality of punishment for crimes with an inherently risk-based
model underlying the SVP laws.41 This is true despite the fact that riskbased assessments for sex offenders are inherently faulty in being
simultaneously subjective and unreliable.42
The special treatment of dangerous sex offenders often is based on a
moralistic philosophy that is inherently confused by whether they are
mad or bad,43 or, more likely, some combination thereof. Thus, the risk
model has adopted a disease mentality through the conflation of medical
pathology and its assumed consequence of evil behaviors.44 The existing
SVP law model is entrenched with a law-psychiatry interface in which
the modern treatment of sex offenders operates via a modal logic that
presumes them a dangerous and bad people due to mental disease. A
commentator has referred to such a model as a form of “desert-disease
jurisprudence” in the way the law reacts to dangerous people. 45 One who
commits a criminal offense normally bears responsibility unless she is
not competent, in which case, she would not deserve punishment.46 But
those with a severe mental disorder are treated differently in the disease
model since they were not acting rationally or autonomously. 47 More
specifically, the SVP law model represents gap-filling between desert
and disease in which normal responsibility rules for criminal versus civil
control are blurred.48 This desert-disease model for sexual transgression,
nonetheless, does not operate to conceptualize offenders as sympathetic
or less culpable.49 The special laws regard sexual deviance as caused by
some degree of volitional, rather than merely cognitive disorder, such
40. Petrunik et al., supra note 35, at 111.
41. Erickson, supra note 25, at 115.
42. Id. See generally Hamilton, supra note 33, at 720–34.
43. Petrunik et al., supra note 35, at 111; see also Steven K. Erickson & Michael J.
Vitacco, Predators and Punishment, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1, 2 (2012). It has
been argued that regarding psychopathy and criminal responsibility, “[d]ating back to the
moral psychiatry movement, those individuals who routinely displayed a lack of respect
for legal rules and social norms without additional evidence of overt mental illness have
posed a dilemma for legal scholars and moral philosophers.” Id. (citation omitted).
44. Petrunik et al., supra note 35, at 111.
45. Stephen J. Morse, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 885, 892 (2011) (citation omitted).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 952–53.
49. Id. at 958.
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that the existence of the mental disorder is typically conceived not as a
mitigating factor; rather, it is usually considered aggravating in nature. 50
These cognitive plus volitional impairments substantiate a presumption
of risk of future dangerousness and, in turn, are used by officials to
justify segregation and containment of sex offenders.51 The SVP law
model of medicalizing social control here also assumes a homogeneous
class of sexual predators in which sexual deviance derives from a mental
disorder—i.e., the disease aspect.52 As others have recognized, this “one
size fits all” mentality seems to underlie criminal justice officials’ efforts
to control sex offenders.53
In sum, management of the sex offender population via SVP laws
currently draws on a desert-disease perspective. One may wonder, then,
about the historical explanation for these policies as uniquely applied to
sex-based offending. It appears likely that SVP laws and the
accompanying law-psychiatry fusion have been influenced by the fact
that, for the last century, mental health professionals have recognized
sexual deviance as a form of mental illness. 54 Today, disorders of sexual
appetite are included in the authoritative treatise of the DSM, currently
under its rubric of paraphilias. The DSM, a categorical classification
system for mental disorders, is the product of an authoritative
institution—the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”).

50. Peggy Heil & Dominique Simons, Multiple Paraphilias: Prevalence, Etiology,
Assessment, and Treatment, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE : THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND
TREATMENT 527, 559 (D. Richard Laws & William T. O’Donohue eds., 2d ed. 2008)
[hereinafter cited individually by author and title]. “Agents who are unable to conform
their conduct to the requirements of the criminal law due to mental defects are excused in
many jurisdictions based on the notion that responsibility requires the ability of
conscious, goal-directed acts.” Erickson & Vitacco, supra note 43, at 3.
51. Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 365.
52. Peggy Heil & Dominique Simons, Multiple Paraphilias: Prevalence, Etiology,
Assessment, and Treatment, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE : THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND
TREATMENT, supra note 50, at 558.
53. Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 361. The authors suggest the plethora of sex
offense-based legislation “appears to have been premised on the false assumption that
those regularly or habitually deviating from sexual norms belong to a relatively
homogeneous offender class, that all members of the class are potentially dangerous, and
that they all need the same sort of legal control.” Id. at 365 (citation omitted).
54. Peggy Heil & Dominique Simons, Multiple Paraphilias: Prevalence, Etiology,
Assessment, and Treatment, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE : THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND
TREATMENT, supra note 50, at 533.
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The Law-Psychiatry Interface

As a general matter, the APA has found a powerful tool in its
diagnostic manual. The DSM is known as the “bible” of psychiatry and
is widely influential across professional disciplines. Through the
acculturation of the DSM, the APA virtually appropriated the field of
mental health. 55 While purportedly based on scientific principles, the
DSM is, at its core, a political document; the APA is a professional
organization that clearly came to understand its ability to assert its power
in the broader world. 56 This is true even for matters otherwise reserved to
legal professionals. A particularly relevant strategy was employed when
the institution adopted the nomenclature of “mental disorder,” which
allowed the APA to broaden the DSM’s coverage and the institution’s
influence in the law enormously.
When psychiatry turned away from the term “mental
illness” to the expansive “mental disorder,” it opened a
Pandora’s Box whereby almost any behavior can be
deemed an affliction of the mind–and used by law to
meet its own political ends. If law is a vehicle in which
political ideas are executed . . . psychiatry has
unwittingly given law the means to achieve politically
efficient ends for dealing with many socially and
politically difficult problems.57
The APA has, since the adoption of the broader genus offered by
the “mental disorder” terminology, continued to expand its coverage.
The DSM originally listed 106 mental disorders in its first edition in
1952.58 The most current edition, the DSM-IV-TR, lists over 250

55. Owen Whooley, Diagnostic Ambivalence: Psychiatric Workarounds and the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 32 SOC. MENTAL ILLNESS 452,
453 (2010); see also Warren A. Kinghorn, Whose Disorder?: A Constructive
MacIntyrean Critique of Psychiatric Nosology, 36 J. MED. & PHIL. 187, 194 (2011)
(asserting that “the DSM project cloaks the will to power in therapeutic veil”).
56. See generally Christopher Cotton & John W. Ridings, Getting Out/Getting In:
The DSM, Political Activism, and the Social Construction of Mental Disorders, 9 SOC.
WORK MENTAL HEALTH 181, 181-92 (2011) (documenting APA’s removing
homosexuality from DSM in 1973 due to political pressure).
57. Erickson, supra note 25, at 73.
58. Id. at 77 n.39.
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disorders.59 Conceivably, the APA can attempt to encompass virtually
any mental phenomenon within the DSM’s taxonomy. With its creation
and maintenance of the DSM, the APA now wields enormous power
over any person or institution, including the law, willing to be governed
by its epistemology and its nosology.60
The APA has asserted its dominion in the criminal justice arena,
more specifically, in adjudging deviance as a mental health issue. In
propagating and monopolizing its classification system for psychiatry,
the APA discovered that “any behavior that produced discomfort or
socially undesirable behavior could be asserted as representing a
disordered psyche irrespective of biological evidence.” 61 Regarding
sexual deviance and paraphilias, as cases in point, critics contend that the
DSM categorizes them as mental disorders not because of “some mental
degeneration of the brain but because such behavior is socially construed
to be a process of a sick mind.”62
C.

The Paraphilic Disorders

The term paraphilia was first introduced to American psychiatry by
the work of Austrian sexologist Richard von Krafft-Ebing, who in 1886
penned Psychopathia Sexualis (Sexual Psychopathy), a work that
continues to be a primary treatise in the sex offender treatment field. 63
The term paraphilia derives from the Greek words para meaning
“beyond, amiss, altered” and philia meaning “love.”64 It has also been
translated as “interest in perversion,” “love of the perverse,” and “love of
something beyond normal.”65 The core of a paraphilia is an abnormal
sexual interest.66

59. Id. at 77.
60. Id. at 98.
61. Id. at 99.
62. Id. at 114.
63. Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 361 n.14.
64. Joel S. Milner et al., Paraphilia Not Otherwise Specified, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE :
THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT, supra note 50, at 384. Another asserts para is
Greek for deviation and philia means attraction. Jerome C. Wakefield, DSM-5 Proposed
Diagnostic Criteria for Sexual Paraphilias: Tensions Between Diagnostic Validity and
Forensic Utility, 34 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 195, 195 (2011).
65. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 3.
66. David Thornton, Evidence Regarding the Need for a Diagnostic Category for a
Coercive Paraphilia, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 411, 411 (2010).
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The APA incorporated this label in the third edition of its taxonomy
(DSM-III) in 1984.67 The initial DSM, published in 1952, considered
sexual deviation a type of sociopathic personality disturbance, while
DSM-II in 1968 referred to sexual deviations.68 The DSM’s change from
sexual deviation to paraphilia in DSM-III was purported to signify an
“atheoretical, non-perjorative descriptor” to disassociate the mental
health concept from the legalistic signifiers of deviance and perversion. 69
Notwithstanding that intent, in the law, paraphilias appear to have
retained a vituperative connotation. For example, recent case law often
represents paraphilias in terms of sexual deviance70 and perversion.71
There are two general criteria for paraphilias. The first, Criterion A,
requires “recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or
behaviors” generally involving: 1) nonhuman objects; 2) the suffering or
humiliation of oneself or one’s partner; or, 3) children or other nonconsenting persons that occur over a period of at least six months. 72
Criterion B is met if “the fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors cause
clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or
other important areas of functioning.”73 For those paraphilias involving
nonconsenting victims (i.e., pedophilia, sexual sadism, voyeurism,
exhibitionism, and frotteurism), Criterion B can alternatively be met if
the person has acted on such urges. 74 Per the DSM’s modal logic,
paraphilias generally appear in early adolescence, are relatively stable,
and are considered rather immutable. 75

67. American psychiatry initially noted the term paraphilia in the 1930s. Milner et
al., supra note 64, at 384.
68. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 8.
69. Milner et al., supra note 64, at 384; Moser & Kleinplatz, supra note 39, at 93.
70. E.g., Yancy v. Voss, No. SACV 06-356-JFW (CW), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
43880, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2011); United States v. Graham, 683 F. Supp. 2d 129,
135 (D. Mass. 2010); Orozco v. Ahlin, No. CV 08-5504 AHM (CT), 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 108797, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2008); In re Johnson, No. A11-792, 2011
Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 902, at *12 (Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2011); In re Brady, No. 0909-00360-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 4502, at *5 (Ct. App. June 16, 2011); People v.
Williams, No. D046925, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4240, at *3 (Ct. App. May 16,
2006); In re E.S.T., 854 A.2d 936, 939 n.2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
71. E.g., United States v. Harris, 339 F. App’x 533, 535 n.2 (6th Cir. 2009); People
v. Hill, No. A126089, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1621, at *12 (Ct. App. Mar. 4,
2011); In re G.R.H., 2008 ND 222, ¶ 4, 758 N.W.2d 719, 721 (N.D. 2008).
72. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.81, at 570.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Lippke, supra note 1, at 152.
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The DSM includes eight specific paraphilias and a residual
category. Comments in the DSM indicate that it is entirely appropriate
for mental health professionals to diagnose an individual with more than
one paraphilia. In the brief introductions of the individual paraphilias that
follow, summary references to the historical origin of their names
highlight their cultural roots. More importantly, the descriptions should
make evident why the paraphilias as mental disorders are considered
commensurate with sex-based crimes.
Pedophilia is the most commonly studied and discussed paraphilia
in clinical and forensic literature. 76 The etymology of pedophile is lover
of children. 77 The appellation derives from the Greek words pedeiktos for
child and philia for love.78 The DSM criterion specific for pedophilia
refers to “intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors
involving sexual activity with a prepubescent child or children (generally
age [thirteen] years or younger).”79
Frotteurism derives from the French verb frotter, which does not
have a sexual connotation per se but means the act of rubbing. 80 In the
DSM, it is described as sexually arousing fantasies or behaviors
involving “touching and rubbing against a nonconsenting person.” 81
Frotteurism is a more recent addition to DSM’s paraphilias, introduced in
1984.82
Exhibitionism involves “exposing one’s genitals to an unsuspecting
stranger,”83 while voyeurism regards the “act of observing an
unsuspecting person who is naked, in the process of disrobing, or
engaging in sexual activity.”84 Another paraphilia is fetishism, which is
76. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 46; Michael C. Seto, Pedophilia: Psychopathology
and Theory, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE : THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT, supra note
50, at 164.
77. STEPHEN T. HOLMES & RONALD M. HOLMES, SEX CRIMES: PATTERNS AND
BEHAVIORS 110 (3d ed. 2009).
78. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 45.
79. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.2, at 571. The DSM pedophilia has another
age specifier in which the individual diagnosed be at least 16 years and more than five
years older than the child of interest.
80. Patrick Lussier & Lyne Piché, Frotteurism: Psychopathology and Theory, in
SEXUAL DEVIANCE : THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT, supra note 50, at 145.
81. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.89, at 570. (positing this common scenario:
“He rubs his genitals against the victim’s thighs and buttocks or fondles her genitalia or
breasts with his hands.”).
82. Niklas Langström, The DSM Diagnostic Criteria for Exhibitionism, Voyeurism,
and Frotteurism, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 317, 320–21 (2010).
83. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.4, at 569.
84. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.82, at 559.
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derived from the Portugese feitiço, meaning artificial. 85 In the DSM, it
includes sexual arousal to “nonliving objects.”86 The DSM has a separate
category for transvestic fetishism, more specifically referring to crossdressing, which the commentary limits to applying only to heterosexual
males.87
Sexual sadism was coined by the same Austrian psychiatrist
responsible for introducing the ideology of paraphilia to the American
profession.88 Krafft-Ebing based the term on the licentious sexual
behaviors of the Marquis de Sade. 89 The DSM describes the sexual
sadistic disorder as “acts (real, not simulated) in which the . . .
psychological or physical suffering (including humiliation) of the victim
[is sexually exciting to the person].”90
Krafft-Ebing also created the term masochism, naming it after the
author Leopold von Sacher-Masoch who wrote erotic novels in the late
1800s, such as the celebrated Venus in Furs about a domineering woman
torturing and subjugating the male hero. 91 In the DSM, sexual
masochism includes the “act (real, not simulated) of being humiliated,
beaten, bound, or otherwise made to suffer.”92

85. Jean-Luc Nancy & Thomas C. Platt, The Two Secrets of the Fetish, 31
DIACRITICS 3, 4 (2001).
86. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.81, at 560-70. Studies show the most common
objects for fetishists are female underwear, feet-related objects (boots, shoes, socks), and
leather. Martin P. Kafka, The DSM Diagnostic Criteria for Fetishism, 39 ARCHIVES
SEXUAL BEHAV. 357, 360 (2010).
87. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.3, at 574-75.
88. Pamela M. Yates et al., Sexual Sadism: Psychopathology and Theory, in
SEXUAL DEVIANCE : THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT, supra note 50, at 213.
89. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 169.
90. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.84, at 573-74 (sadists’ desired responses are
obedience, submission, humiliation, fear, and terror.) AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 167.
For sexual sadists, the suffering is sexually arousing, not the infliction of pain. Id. The
DSM offers examples:
Sadistic fantasies or acts may involve activities that indicate the
dominance of the person over the victim (e.g., forcing the victim to
crawl or keeping the victim in a cage). They may also involve
restraint, blindfolding, paddling, spanking, whipping, pinching,
beating, burning, electrical shocks, rape, cutting, stabbing,
strangulation, torture, mutilation, or killing.
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.84, at 573.
91. Mary Jane Heron & William J. Herron, Meanings of Sadism and Masochism, 50
PSYCHOL. REP. 199, 199 (1982).
92. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.83, at 573.
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Finally, there is a residual category. Paraphilia not otherwise
specified (“paraphilia NOS”) is a diagnosis reserved for what might
otherwise qualify as a paraphilia by virtue of the general criteria, but fails
sufficiently to meet the standards for any of the eight specific categories.
The DSM expresses that “[e]xamples include, but are not limited to,
telephone scatologia (obscene phone calls), necrophilia (corpses),
partialism (exclusive focus on part of body), zoophilia (animals),
coprophilia (feces), klismaphilia (enemas), and urophilia (urine).” 93 This
residual category of paraphilia NOS was introduced to the DSM in
1987.94 Professionals refer to paraphilia NOS as a wastebasket 95 or a
catchall category. 96 Some sex offender treatment experts have identified
more than fifty paraphilias in the NOS category in the literature, 97 while
others allege hundreds have been identified. 98
The uses of paraphilia NOS which have garnered the most debate in
the sexual offender treatment community, and in the courts, involve what
is commonly referred to as “paraphilia NOS-nonconsent” in two forms.
One is commonly described in terms of rape paraphilia, and the other is
known as hebephilia, which involves sexual interest in pubescent or
postpubescent children.99 The explanation for these two is based on the
fact that paraphilia NOS is a residual category with no criteria of its
own.100 Thus, the natural reference point is the general criteria of the
paraphilias as a nosological category. Criterion A is the most relevant
one, which includes a subcategory alternative of sexual interest or

93. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.9, at 576.
94. John Matthew Fabian, Diagnosing and Litigating Hebephilia in Sexually
Violent Predator Civil Commitment Proceedings, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 496,
498 (2011) [hereinafter Fabian, Diagnosing and Litigating].
95. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 195.
96. United States v. Caporale, No. 5:08-HC-2037-BO, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
55794, at *1, *7 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 20, 2012); Orozco v. Ahlin, No. CV 08-5504 AHM
(CT), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108797, at *26 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2008); Prentky et al.,
supra note 27, at 366.
97. Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 362 (conceding likely many others).
98. E.g., In re Williams, 264 P.3d 570, 572 n.5 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); J. Paul
Fedoroff, Forensic and Diagnostic Concerns Arising from the Proposed DSM-5 Criteria
for Sexual Paraphilic Disorder, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 238, 240 (2011);
Michael B. First & Robert L. Halon, Use of DSM Paraphilia Diagnoses in Sexually
Violent Predator Commitment Cases, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 443, 445 (2008)
(noting that famous sexologist John Money identified and named over 100 deviant sexual
interests); Milner et al., supra note 64, at 390 (noting some are subtypes of existing
paraphilias).
99. Fabian, Diagnosing and Litigating, supra note 94, at 497.
100. Id. at 499.
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behavior regarding nonconsenting persons. A rape victim by definition
was not consenting and, in hebephilia, a pubescent or postpubescent
youth under the age of sixteen generally cannot legally consent to sexual
contact.
D.

The Law and Paraphilias

Case law references to DSM paraphilia diagnoses are legion.
Overall, judicial curiosity in understanding the meaning of paraphilias is
evident in the frequent exercise in judicial opinions of describing them in
layman’s terms. Often the portrayal of the paraphilias generally are in
terms of sexual deviance and perversion. 101 In addition, judicial opinions
use normative descriptions such as abnormal arousal.102 Similarly,
decisions concerning the length of sentences suggest abnormal sexual
preference103 and disorder of sexual appetite. 104 As another specific
example, a state expert in one case referred to paraphilia as “odd sexual
behavior in general.”105 The expert went on to explain that “[a]ny oddity,
any peculiarity of a sexual object, [or any] sexual activity with that
object . . . [is] love of the different.” 106 In a prosecution on child
molestation charges, a state expert described paraphilia as the preferred
way of sexual gratification that is different from the “normal male/male,
female/female, male/female sexual interacting or courting kind of
behavior.”107
Numerous cases mention specific paraphilias. Pedophilia, rape
paraphilia, and hebephilia references are evaluated in detail below. Still,
it is noted that opinions cite diagnoses of sexual masochism, 108
101. See supra notes 71-72 and cases cited therein.
102. In re Williams, 264 P.3d at 572; see also United States v. Graham, 683 F.
Supp. 2d 129, 135 (D. Mass. 2010) (citation omitted) (asserting that paraphilias are “not
within the realm of what are considered and defined as normal or appropriate sexual
behavior”).
103. United States v. Pritchard, 392 F. App’x 433, 435 n.2 (6th Cir. 2010).
104. Commonwealth v. Rossmeisl, No. 1952-05, 4326-05, 1918 EDA 2006, 1919
EDA 2006, 2006 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 285, at *12 (Aug. 16, 2006).
105. People v. Seja, F059924, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5474, at *4 (Ct. App.
July 22, 2011).
106. Id.
107. People v. Hill, No. A126089, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1621, at *8-9
(Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2011). The court condoned such evidence as relevant to the defendant’s
mental state at the time of the crime. Id. at *41.
108. Paulos v. Ludeman, No. A10-1634, 2011 Minn. App. LEXIS 185, at *4 (Ct.
App. Mar. 1, 2011); In re Brian J., 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 246, 256 (Ct. App. 2007); Medley v.
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frotteurism, 109 fetishism, 110 exhibitionism, 111 and voyeurism. 112 Cases
mention diagnoses of sexual sadism, 113 while others used the phraseology
of atypical paraphilia with sadistic features 114 or paraphilia with sadistic
features.115 Although infrequent, opinions mention diagnoses of some
other diagnoses linking to the NOS genre, including telephone
scatalogia,116 zoophilia,117 urophilia,118 klismaphilia,119 and partialism. 120
The mental diseases of sexual deviance matter for a host of issues in
criminal law, such as insanity, competency, bail, sentencing, and
parole. 121 They also clearly dominate legal decisions to civilly commit
Ludeman, No. A07-97, 2007 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 705, at *5 (Ct. App. July 10,
2007); In re Kapprelian, 168 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Armstrong,
152 Ohio App. 3d 579, 2003-Ohio-2154, 789 N.E.2d 657, at ¶ 27 (9th Dist. Lorain Cnty.
2003).
109. Bonior v. Conerly, 416 F. App’x 475, 476 (6th Cir. 2010); People v. Towne,
No. H033465, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1602, at *5-6 (Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2011); In
re Hanenberg, 2010 ND 8, ¶ 3, 777 N.W.2d 62, 63 (N.D. 2010).
110. E.g., In re A.M., 2010 ND 163, ¶ 3, 787 N.W.2d 752, 754 (2010); In re
R.L.C., No. A-0941-07T2, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpib. LEXIS 2451, at *6 (App. Div. Sept.
30, 2009); State v. Prust, 2004 WI App 68, ¶ 3, 271 Wis. 2d 818, 677 N.W.2d 732 (Ct.
App. 2004); M.V.M. v. Tartalia, No. 2588-9-II, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 1161, at *4 (Ct.
App. June 1, 2001).
111. Laxton v. Bartow, 421 F.3d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 2005); Towne, 2011 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 1602, at *5; People v. Calderon, No. B206734, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 1427, at *9 (Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2009); In re O.S., 763 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Neb.
2009).
112. Laxton, 421 F.3d at 567.
113. Litmon v. Flores, No. C 03-03996 RMW (PR), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58545,
at *19 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2008); In re Sugden, 2010 WI App 166, ¶ 6, 30 Wis. 2d 628,
795 N.W.2d 456 (Ct. App. 2010).
114. Maimon v. Belleque, No. 06-1100-PA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44064, at *4
(D. Or. June 15, 2007).
115. Ehler v. Or. Bd. of Parole, No. 08-483-KI, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63751, at
*1–2 (D. Or. July 24, 2009); In re Day, 342 S.W.3d 193, 206 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011).
116. In re Henson, 97 S.W.3d 67, 69 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Maybrey, No.
01C01-9703-CC-00117, 1998 WL 161144, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 1998); State
v. George, No. 01C01-9512-CC-00407, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 250, at *1, *7
(Tenn. Crim. App. May 13, 1997).
117. In re Hanenberg, 2010 ND 8, ¶ 3, 777 N.W.2d 62, 63 (2010); In re Grinstead,
No. 09-07-00412-CV, 2008 WL 5501164, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2009); People v.
Grant, No. A 092910, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3417, at *11 (Ct. App. Mar. 5,
2002).
118. Fair v. State, 161 P.3d 466, 468 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
119. People v. Hubbart, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490, 498 (Ct. App. 2001).
120. People v. Martinez, No. D055776, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2887, at *3
(Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2011); People v. Wright, No. C057457, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 2325, at *3 (Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2009).
121. See infra notes 8-21 and accompanying text.
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sex offenders. Notably, the desert-disease model and the APA’s
influence via the DSM are especially evident in the sexual predator civil
commitment regime. 122 Twenty states and the federal government
statutorily permit the indefinite commitment of sexually violent
offenders to secure psychiatric facilities—purportedly for treatment and
potential cure.123 A recent survey counted at least 3500 individuals
currently committed or detained under such laws in those jurisdictions
that responded. 124 In some states, approximately five percent of sex
offenders about to be released upon serving their sentences are civilly
committed.125 Significantly, such detention, though extreme in nature, is
external to the normal criminal adjudication and sentencing system for
criminal offenses.126 Those committed are rarely ever released. 127
The typical sexual offender civil commitment statute requires three
elements: (1) a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense; and, (2) a
mental disorder or disability (3) causing the individual significant
difficulty in controlling recidivist behavior. 128 The second element is the
most relevant to paraphilias. Critics contend that the courts have been
“deliberately vague” in defining mental disorder and permitting “far too
much latitude and inconsistency.”129 Notwithstanding such displeasure,
122. Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 361 (“The growth of sexually violent person
commitment laws seems premised on the idea that by forcing a connection between the
individual defendant and the treatment facility and by then supervising that connection
for a reasonable time period, the criminal justice system can promote treatment.”).
123. Corey Rayburn Yung, Sex Offender Exceptionalism and Preventive Detention,
101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969, 975-76 (2011) (citation omitted).
124. REBECCA J ACKSON ET AL., SOCCPN ANNUAL SURVEY OF SEX OFFENDER CIVIL
COMMITMENT
PROGRAMS
2011
(2011),
available
at
http://www.soccpn.org/images/SOCCPN_Annual_Survey_2011_revised_1_.pdf.
125. Richard W. Elwood et al., Diagnostic and Risk Profiles of Men Detained
under Wisconsin’s Sexually Violent Person Law, 54 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY &
COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 187, 188 (2010) (indicating about 4% referred to commitment in
Wisconsin); Jennifer E. Schneider, A Review of Research Findings Related to the Civil
Commitment of Sex Offenders, 36 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 463, 465 (2008) (noting 3.3%–
6.4% annually in Minnesota from 1991-1999).
126. See genrally Elwood et al., supra note 125, at 188.
127. Schneider, supra note 125, at 479.
128. See also Allen Frances et al., Defining Mental Disorder When it Really
Counts: DSM-IV-TR and SVP/SDP Statutes, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 375, 377
(2008); Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 365.
129. Shoba Sreenivasan et al., Normative Versus Consequential Ethics in Sexually
Violent Predator Laws: An Ethics Conundrum for Psychiatry, 38 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 386, 390 (2010); see also Frances et al., supra note 128, at 376–77;
Prentky et al., supra note 27, at 360 (“The problem of translation is amplified in the SVP
context because the legal categories and thresholds are themselves poorly defined, in
large measure because of the lack of clarity about the normative values underlying these
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the Supreme Court considered the second element for purposes of sex
offender civil commitment in the case of Kansas v. Hendricks.130 There,
the state sought to commit the defendant based on a long history of
sexually abusing children and a diagnosis of pedophilia. 131 The lower
court ruled that the state’s commitment statute, which used the
terminology “mental abnormality” for the second element, was
insufficiently vague for due process purposes. 132 The Supreme Court
reversed, ruling that even though the Court’s previous discussion of a
qualifying disorder for civil commitment referred to it as a “mental
illness,” such terminology was not intended as having any “talismanic
significance” and the Court had “never required state legislatures to
adopt any particular nomenclature in drafting [a] civil commitment
[law].”133 Instead, legislatures retain much freedom in crafting terms that
have legal meaning. 134 The Hendricks Court then expressly recognized
that a diagnosis of pedophilia was a sufficient diagnosis for the purpose
of sex offender civil commitment,135 thereby opening the door to the
acceptance of other paraphilias as qualifying diagnoses.
The strong influence of the paraphilias in committal proceedings is
consistently shown by statistical analyses. Studies of those committed or
detained in sexual offender commitment facilities indicate that the
diagnosis of any paraphilia ranges from forty-six percent to ninety-eight
percent.136 Pedophilia and paraphilia NOS are the most common
disorders cited in civil commitment proceedings, 137 with roughly half of
those committed or detained being diagnosed with one or the other. 138
laws.”); Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 365 (“That these statutes used inconsistent
definitions of proscribed sexual behaviors is hardly surprising since the public, mental
health professionals, and the legal profession hold such widely divergent views as to what
defined a sexually dangerous person.”).
130. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
131. Id. at 354.
132. Id. at 356.
133. Id. at 359.
134. Id. Likely as a result of the ruling, the federal sex offender commitment statute
enacted with the Adam Walsh Child Protection Act of 2006 delineates the second
element in a manner potentially to cover all bases: “mental illness, abnormality, or
disorder . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2006).
135. 521 U.S. at 360.
136. Schneider, supra note 125, at 465, 467.
137. Rebecca L. Jackson & Derek T. Hess, Evaluation for Civil Commitment of Sex
Offenders: A Survey of Experts, 19 SEX ABUSE 425, 427 (2007); Julia E. McLawsen et
al., Civilly Committed Sex Offenders: A Description and Interstate Comparison of
Populations, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 453, 453 (2012).
138. Shan Jumper et al., Diagnostic Profiles of Civilly Committed Sexual Offenders

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/2

18

ADJUDICATING S EX CRIMES AS MENTAL DISEASE

554

PACE LAW REVIEW

7/26/2013 4:32 PM

[Vol. 33:2

Researchers have also shown the salience of a paraphilia diagnosis for
positive decisions to civilly commit. 139 In a study of a large sample of
individuals evaluated for commitment, bivariate results showed the
factor with the highest correlation to a recommendation of commitment
was a paraphilia NOS diagnosis, greater even than antisocial personality
disorder.140 Pedophilia was also highly correlated and had a statistical
effect (i.e., positive impact) greater even than the number of previous
victims or the individual’s statement of intent to commit a new sex
crime. 141 A logistic regression analysis likewise found a significant
impact on the likelihood of the assessor to recommend commitment:
holding constant other variables of interest, a paraphilia NOS diagnosis
raised the odds of being recommended for commitment by over 10,500%
while a pedophilia diagnosis raised the odds over 4500%.142 These
studies provide clear evidence of the role that diagnoses of sexual
deviance play in imposing preventive detention.
Likely an important reason that these disorders matter to legal
decisions and are routinely used to justify long-term restrictions for both
criminal law and civil commitment purposes is that the DSM
conceptualizes paraphilias as a systemic issue within the individual. This
conceptualization often appears in case law. Opinions often cite experts
referring to the chronic nature of paraphilias. 143 One expert made this
assertion abundantly clear, describing paraphilia as “chronic, unremitting
life-long deviant sexual behavior.”144 An expert in another case justified
a current paraphilia diagnosis despite the defendant’s last sexual offense
occurring sixteen years earlier, based, in part, on his history of offending
in Illinois and Other Reporting Jurisdictions: What We Know So Far, 56 INT’L J.
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 838, 838 (2012).
139. Jill S. Levenson & John W. Morin, Factors Predicting Selection of Sexually
Violent Predators for Civil Commitment, 50 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP.
CRIMINOLOGY 609, 618 (2006).
140. Id.
141. Id. Sexual sadism increased the odds of commitment recommendation
85,500% but result not statistically significant because of the few cases with the
diagnosis. Id. at 621-22.
142. Id.
143. E.g., United States v. Shields, 597 F. Supp. 2d 224, 234 (D. Mass. 2009);
Orozco v. Ahlin, No. CV 08-5504 AHM (CT) 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108797, at *18
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2008); In re Day, 342 S.W.3d 193, 205 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011); In re
Brady, No. 09-09-00360-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 4502, at *5, *17 (Ct. App. June 16,
2011); In re Williams, 264 P.3d 570, 572 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); People v. Seymour, No.
A115509, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 757, at *52 (Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2009).
144. People v. Meyers, No. C042511, 2005 WL 1303553, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. June
2, 2005).

19

ADJUDICATING S EX CRIMES AS MENTAL DISEASE

2013]

SEX CRIMES AS MENTAL DISEASE

7/26/2013 4:32 PM

555

prior to that conviction, analogizing the situation to “once an alcoholic,
always an alcoholic.”145 Case opinions similarly contain descriptions of
paraphilias in terms of addiction, such as an expert characterizing
paraphilia as an addictive disorder,146 and in another, the witness
indicated that pedophilia is a “lifelong problem, like an addiction.” 147
Other cases note that testifying experts denoted paraphilic conditions as
evidently incurable,148 such as assuring that the disorder is one that
“[would] not go away with time.” 149 At the same time, some experts are
noted as indicating that a paraphilic disorder can be treated and possibly
controlled over the long term. 150
In sum, courts’ frequent utilization of the mental diseases of sexual
deviance indicates that these diseases resonate in the law and that they
impact legal decisions, with important consequences for individuals. To
the extent these decisions drive adjudication, sentencing, parole, and
commitment consequences, they also impact the use and expenditure of
government resources. The next section considers various normative and
empirical issues that test the law-psychiatry interface and questions the
propriety of those results.

145. Felix v. Hennessey, No. C 01-3138 WHA (PR), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91926,
at *4 (N.D. Ca. Aug. 11, 2010); see also Dunivan v. State, 247 S.W.3d 77, 78 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2008) (indicating most psychologists believe past behavior is best predictor of
future behavior).
146. Litmon v. Flores, No. C 03-03996 RMW (PR) Docket No. 45, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 58545, at *17 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2008).
147. In re Brian J., 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 246, 257 (Ct. App. 2007).
148. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1200 (11th Cir. 2010) (pedophilia);
People v. Scott, No. F060923, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7648, at *7 (Ct. App. Oct.
6, 2011) (paraphilia NOS-nonconsent); State v. Sugden, 2010 WI App 166, ¶ 61, 330
Wis. 2d 628, 795 N.W.2d 456 (Ct. App. 2010) (paraphilia nonconsent); People v.
Schmidt, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9490, at *25, *93 (Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2002)
(sexual sadism).
149. Dunivan, 247 S.W.3d at 78; see also People v. Meyers, No. C042511, 2005
WL 1303553, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. June 2, 2005) (indicating that while rapes occurred
years before, with no evidence of sexual activity while confined, paraphilia is “an
extremely deep-seated medical disorder that is life-long”).
150. E.g., Yancy v. Voss, No. SACV 06-356-JFW (CW), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
43880, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2011); In re Day, 342 S.W.3d 193, 203 (Tex. Ct. App.
2011); People v. Seymour, No. A115509, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 757, at *53 (Ct.
App. Jan. 28, 2009).
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III. The Law-Paraphilia Divide: Normative and Empirical Challenges
The gap-filling, desert-disease model of sex offender laws provides
some utility to criminal justice officials in attempting to protect society
from sexual predators. Still, the law-psychiatry interface and the
translation between scientific and legal terms is a necessary yet
potentially hazardous feat considering the substantial infringement on
liberty and privacy that the laws inflict. 151 Putting it bluntly,
commentators writing about the “most critical problems that occur at the
intersection of law and science in the (SVP) context,” note two general
concerns, those being that “‘good science’ will be unrecognized or
misunderstood by the law and that the pressures of the law will not only
use but encourage ‘bad science.’ Both concerns are potential sources of
injustice and . . . threaten the integrity of science and the law.” 152
A.

Normophilia: Contrasting Sexual Deviance

The DSM’s asserted vision of the paraphilic disorders contemplates
psychosexual interest in unusual objects, activities, or situations. The
paraphilias, then, are theoretically contrasted with its antonym:
normophilia.153 A relevant inquiry is how to define normal sexual
interests and behaviors and then to consider what value such an exercise
has for society. It turns out that such categorization serves prevailing
political and social interests by drawing import from psychiatry. Even
though psychiatric diseases are intended to be based on scientific
principles—rather than being prescriptive—the lynchpin of the sexual
interest being an unusual one inherently involves also a normative
inquiry.
History has shown that all societies endeavor to normalize sexual
preferences and to regulate the sexual behavior of their members. 154 The
definition of what is erotically normative and who decides, is, therefore,
pivotal. In Western culture, the definitional role evolved from the
nineteenth century’s religious model of sin to one drawing also on
pathological criminality in the twentieth century. 155 The particular
strategy of control in the last few decades and into the twenty-first
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Prentky et al., supra note 27, at 359–60.
Id. at 357-58.
AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 1 (citation omitted).
See Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 365.
Moser & Kleinplatz, supra note 39, at 94.
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century has involved defining any sexual interest considered deviant as
pathognomonic, and hence symptomatic, of mental disease. 156 As a
result, the “equating of unusual sexual interests with psychiatric
diagnoses has been used to justify the oppression of sexual minorities
and to serve political agendas.”157 This explains the relevance of
paraphilias in modern law.
In anthropological terms, paraphilias provide an emic categorization
for a Westernized method of situating normality and inflicting societal
pressures, causing individuals who vary sexually from the norm to
experience distress.158 But there are fundamental problems with this
disease-based model. Psychiatrists have always had trouble with
consistency in defining paraphilias or in distinguishing them from nonparaphilic, or normal, sexual interests.159 What are considered deviant
sexual interests vary cross-culturally and, within any culture, vacillate. 160
As typical sex practices change, “some paraphilias based upon a specific
erotic interest may come and go as a function of historical realities.”161
Even within any time frame or cultural base, there are thorny issues
in differentiating what is normal as compared to abnormal; and further,
what is abnormal and also deserving a pathologizing stigma. 162 Often the
basis for defining normality is related to procreative sex. Krafft-Ebing,
on whose work the American psychiatric profession’s initial embrace of

156. Id. at 92.
157. Id. at 93.
158. D.L. Davis & R.G. Whitten, The Cross-Cultural Study of Human Sexuality, 16
ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 69, 76 (1987).
159. Charles Moser, Yet Another Paraphilia Definition Fails, 40 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAV. 483, 483 (2011).
160. Dinesh Bhugra et al., Paraphilias Across Cultures: Contexts and
Controversies, 47 J. SEX RES. 242, 242 (2010).
Humans are sexual animals, but vary across culture in their
propensity to use sex as a non-procreative and pleasurable activity.
Sexual behaviors in the non-procreative tradition differ across
partners; depend on the availability of partners, fantasies, and
opportunities; and are influenced by cultural norms, mores or morals,
religion, religious taboos, types of societies, and expectations of its
members.
Id.
161. Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 362.
162. D. Richard Laws & William T. O’Donohue, Introduction, in SEXUAL
DEVIANCE : THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT, supra note 50, at 2 (noting such
decisions are value judgments).
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paraphilias was based, considered any non-procreative activity as
perverse. In his view, bestiality, fellation, cunnilingus, and
homosexuality were perversions, while rape was not because it could
result in pregnancy. 163 In a similar vein, the DSM-II offered the
following description for its diagnostic category of sexual deviations:
This category is for individuals whose sexual interests
are directed primarily toward objects other than people
of the opposite sex, toward sexual acts not usually
associated with coitus, or toward coitus performed under
bizarre circumstances, as in necrophilia, pedophilia,
sexual sadism, and fetishism. 164
These indicate some continued vestige in religiosity, though other
references could be used to determine normalcy, such as statistical,
cultural, or subjective measures. 165
Because of the value judgment underlying normality and the
uncertainty of human sexuality, together the paraphilias are perhaps the
most contested group in the DSM.166 A critic notes that the DSM’s vision
of sexual normality is too simplistic, pathologizing behaviors or fantasies
that historically are quite common. 167 The DSM paraphilias appear to be
based on an assumption that normal sex is about intimate bonding, yet
historically, much sex involves coercive schemas and indulging power
imbalances. 168 For instance, sadistic and masochistic behaviors are fairly
163. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 2.
164. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS DSM-II, § 302, at 44 (2d ed. 1968).
165. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 8; HOLMES & HOLMES, supra note 77, at 13-18.
166. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 195.
167. Andrew C. Hinderliter, Defining Paraphilia: Excluding Exclusion, 2 OPEN
ACCESS
J.
FORENSIC
PSYCHOL.
241,
253
(2010),
available
at
http://forensicpsychologyunbound.ws/OAJFP/Volume_2__2010_files/Hinderliter%2020
10.pdf; see also Lippke, supra note 1, at 152. Surveys of male college students show
many would rape a woman if assured of not being caught. See generally Mary P. Koss et
al., The Scope of Rape: Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual Aggression and Victimization
in a National Sample of Higher Education Students, 55 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 162 (1987); Neil M. Malamuth, Rape Proclivity Among Males, 37 J. SOC.
ISSUES 138 (1981); Neil M. Malamuth et al., Sexual Responsiveness of College Students
to Rape Depictions: Inhibitory and Disinhibitory Effects, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 399 (1980).
168. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 170 (observing sadomasochistic activities occur
in “normal” lovemaking since dominance and aggression have social value); Hinderliter,
supra note 167, at 255.
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common169 and are ubiquitous themes in pornographic materials. 170
Empirical studies similarly show that interests and behaviors considered
abnormal in the DSM paraphilias are prevalent among the public at
large.171 For example, a survey of undergraduate men showed that
ninety-five percent reported having at least one deviant fantasy and that
sixty-three percent had engaged in at least one deviant behavior. 172
Similarly, in a community sample of men ages forty to seventy-nine,
researchers found that sixty-two percent reported some degree of sexual
arousal from at least one paraphilia-related stimulus while forty-four
percent had engaged in at least one paraphilia-related sexual behavior. 173
Extrapolating to the prevalence in the general population, the authors of
the latter study concluded that “[i]n view of this number, both mental and
real-life sexual experiences that are currently commonly regarded as

169. Richard B. Krueger, The DSM Diagnostic Criteria for Sexual Masochism, 39
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 346, 351 (2010) (indicating 1-5% of Americans engage in
sexually masochistic or sadomasochistic behavior); Richard B. Krueger, The DSM
Diagnostic Criteria for Sexual Sadism, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 325, 326 (2010)
[hereinafter Krueger, Sexual Sadism].
170. Pamela M. Yates et al., Sexual Sadism: Psychopathology and Theory, in
SEXUAL DEVIANCE : THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT, supra note 50, at 215; Ana
J. Bridges et al., Aggression and Sexual Behavior in Best-Selling Pornography Videos: A
Content Analysis Update, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1065, 1075 (2010) (finding
eighty-eight percent of scenes in popular pornography videos include physical
aggression--primarily spanking, gagging, slapping).
171. Studies indicate a significant percentages of men in the community fantasize
about coercive sexual encounters. WILLIAM H. MASTERS & VIRGINIA E. JOHNSON,
HOMOSEXUALITY IN PERSPECTIVE 179 (1979) (finding forced sexual encounters were
among the most reported sexual fantasies across gender/sexualities); Virginia
Greendlinger & Donn Byrne, Coercive Sexual Fantasies of College Men as Predictors of
Self-Reported Likelihood of Rape and Overt Sexual Aggression, 23 J. SEX RES. 1, 5
(1987) (finding nearly 54% of college men so fantasizing); A. B. Heilbrun & David T.
Seif, Erotic Value of Female Distress in Sexually Explicit Photographs, 24 J. SEX RES.
47, 53 (1988) (reporting fantasies depicting women bound and in distress); Neil M.
Malamuth & James V.P. Check, Sexual Arousal to Rape Depictions: Individual
Differences, 92 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 55, 59 (1983) (reporting fantasies involving
victim’s pain).
172. Kevin M. Williams et al., Inferring Sexually Deviant Behavior from
Corresponding Fantasies: The Role of Personality and Pornography Consumption, 36
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 198, 205 (2009) (prevalence of fantasies were 62% sadism, 83%
voyeurism, 72% frotteurism, 13% pedophilia, 68% sexual assault, while the percentages
for sexually deviant behaviors were 22%, 18%, 44%, 5%, and 25%, respectively).
173. Christopher Joseph Ahlers et al., How Unusual are the Contents of
Paraphilias? Paraphilia-Associated Sexual Arousal Patterns in a Community-Based
Sample of Men, 8 J. SEXUAL MED. 1362, 1366, 1369 (2011) (breaking down for the
paraphilic-stimulus as fetishistic (24.5%), masochistic (18.5%), sadistic (24.8%),
voyeuristic (38.7%), frotteuristic (15.0%), and pedophilic (10.4%)).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/2

24

ADJUDICATING S EX CRIMES AS MENTAL DISEASE

560

PACE LAW REVIEW

7/26/2013 4:32 PM

[Vol. 33:2

peculiar and exotic should lose their status as ‘rarities.’”174
Others surmise that the paraphilias currently embodied in the DSM
indicate that the authors have not considered the evolution of sexual
mores.175 A diagnostic descriptor unique to pedophilia provides a specific
example that the DSM has been resistant to societal change. The latest
DSM (DSM-IV-TR)176 regards the sexual interest in prepubescent
children and includes a parenthetical indicating a general description of
children age thirteen and younger. Yet, the prepubescent nature of the
child of interest is supposed to be at the heart of it being a disorder of
sexual preference. Today, the age of thirteen does not truly represent the
body shape, here being the degree of secondary sex characteristics, of
prepubescence. 177 Statistics show that pubescence now generally occurs
much earlier.178 For this reason, commentators criticize the DSM’s vision
of pedophilia as “using 1990s diagnostic criteria without employing
additional knowledge derived from 21st-century science and specialized
practice.”179
Another issue with the modal assumption of chronicity is that the
disorders of sexuality ignore the fact that an individual’s sexuality is
malleable. 180 Interestingly, while paraphilias presume that individuals
with the particular sexual interests covered therein are deviant, those who
lack sexual desire are also targeted in the DSM, just within other
categories (such as sexual arousal disorder or hypoactive sexual desire
disorder).181 In sum, there appears no logical explanation for why certain
paraphilias have been specifically recognized while others have not. 182
Consider these examples: Why is fetishism involving nonliving objects

174. Id. The percentages of those engaging in paraphilic activities included those
related to fetishism (24.5%), masochistic (2.3%), sadistic (15.5%), voyeuristic (18.0%),
frotteuristic (6.4%), and pedophilic (3.8%). Id. at 1366.
175. Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 362; see also Langström, supra note 82, at 320–21
(reporting Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare in 2009 deleted the paraphilias
of fetishism, sadomasochism, and transvestism from Swedish version of the World
Health Organization’s ICD-10).
176. DSM-5 was pending at the time of this article. DSM-5: The Future of
Psychiatric
Diagnosis,
AM.
PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N,
http://www.dsm5.org/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited May 10, 2013).
177. Robin J. Wilson et al., Pedophilia: An Evaluation of Diagnostic and Risk
Prediction Methods, 23 SEXUAL ABUSE 260, 271 (2011).
178. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 205.
179. Wilson et al., supra note 177, at 271.
180. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 195.
181. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, §§ 302.71-.72, at 539, 543.
182. Fedoroff, supra note 98, at 240; Moser & Kleinplatz, supra note 39, at 96.

25

ADJUDICATING S EX CRIMES AS MENTAL DISEASE

2013]

7/26/2013 4:32 PM

SEX CRIMES AS MENTAL DISEASE

561

listed when it may be a solitary activity? With the large market for
pornography materials, is voyeurism necessarily deviant? Is sexual
fantasy involving a thirteen-year-old necessarily indicative of a diseased
mind?
Notwithstanding the issue of what objects of interest are irregular, it
is evident that fantasy and sexual interest are not always linked to actual
sexual activity. 183 A recent study comparing samples of undergraduate
males with convicted child molesters showed the former had more
fantasies overall and more with sadomasochistic themes, even after
adjusting for the potential for the molester group to underreport because
of offenders’ likelihood to provide biased responses in an attempt to
provide socially desirable answers. 184 Reviewing empirical literature
generally, other authors realistically conclude the following:
The idea that unusual or deviant sexual interests
automatically lead to sexual offending or that all sexual
offending refers directly to the presence of sexual
deviant preferences is untenable (however invariably
popular with (screen) writers). Numerous unusual sexual
interests do not lead to offending behavior because they
are directed towards objects (e.g. fetishism) or because
people find other consenting adults to sexually interact
with (e.g. sadomasochism). Interest in illegal sexual
interactions (children or nonconsenting persons) can be
found in a substantial part of the (male) population. The
majority of them, however, never seem to act on these
interests.185
183. A Finnish study of men age 33–43 found the mean minimum age of preferred
targets of sexual interest and fantasy was 24 years while the mean minimum age of actual
sexual partners was around 34 years. Pekka Santtila et al., Child Sexual Interactions with
other Children are Associated with Lower Preferred Age of Sexual Partners Including
Sexual Interest in Children in Adulthood, 175 PSYCHIATRY RES. 154, 156 (2010)
(acknowledging reasons results may not be generalizable).
184. Georgianna C. Brain, A Comparison of the Nature and Prevalence of Sexual
Fantasies Between Sex Offenders and Non-Offenders 24-5 (Aug. 2011) (unpublished
M.S. thesis, Texas State University) (on file with Texas State University).
185. Wineke Smid et al., Proxy Measures of Sexual Deviancy, in INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS 172, 180
(Douglas Peter Boer et al. eds., 2011); see also Jerome V. Baumgartner et al., Assessment
of the Wilson Sex Fantasy Questionnaire Among Child Molesters and Nonsexual
Forensic Offenders, 14 SEXUAL ABUSE 19, 25 (2002) (finding hospitalized child
molesters did not score significantly different on scales of sexually deviant fantasies than
college males and samples of those sexually deviant but not criminals).
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The classification of any particular sexual interest or behavior as
unusual, and therefore paraphilic, is not the only problematic issue.
Whether the paraphilia group should even be in the DSM is itself
controversial. 186 A valid question, though left conspicuously unanswered
by the APA, is: When does a certain sexual pleasure—even assuming it
is unusual—become a mental disorder?187 The APA has not made clear
how the paraphilias that are included are inherently dysfunctional to the
individual other than the disabling consequences that may be imposed by
societal or legal reactions. 188 Experts note there is scant empirical
evidence of any disease process that can explain the existence of the
paraphilias listed in the DSM.189 Indeed, the paraphilias so listed are not
based on objective or empirical evidence of disorder. 190 To the contrary,
studies exist that contradict the presence of any pathology or dysfunction
that are otherwise deemed necessary to qualify as DSM mental
disorders.191 It is notable that American psychiatry’s conceptualization
may be unique in the world. The British Psychological Society issued a
statement in 2011 critiquing the inclusion of paraphilias in the DSM:
“We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the
relational context of problems and the undeniable social causation of
many such problems[, and] of particular concern are the subjective and
socially normative aspects of sexual behavior.”192 Mental health experts
around the world continue to express concern with the seeming
unscientific basis for the DSM’s sexual disorders. Even with the
impending newest edition, to be referred to as DSM-5 and to be finalized
in 2013, the APA has especially chosen not to field test the paraphilia
group.193 All of this strongly suggests that the strong focus on
“normality,” while eschewing the pathological element, means that
paraphilias are more of a value-laden social construct than primarily a
medical or scientific concept.194 Together, the foregoing observations
186. Hinderliter, supra note 167, at 241.
187. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 195.
188. D. Richard Laws & William T. O’Donohue, Introduction, in SEXUAL
DEVIANCE : THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT, supra note 50, at 2.
189. Erickson, supra note 25, at 114.
190. Moser & Kleinplatz, supra note 39, at 94.
191. Id.
192. C. A. ALLAN, THE BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL SOC’Y, RESPONSE TO THE
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION: DSM-5 DEVELOPMENT 25 (2011), available at
http://apps.bps.org.uk/_publicationfiles/consultation-responses/DSM-5%202011%20%20BPS%20response.pdf.
193. Fedoroff, supra note 98, at 238.
194. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 4.
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may explain ambiguities in the diagnostic criteria underlying the DSM
disorders of sexual deviance.
B.

Diagnostic Issues

Diagnostic vagueness in the paraphilia classifications is concerning.
Notably, there are no validated or standardized diagnostic instruments
which are available for the paraphilias.195 Without clear boundaries, the
paraphilia disorders cannot, then, even theoretically, distinguish
adequately those with a mental disorder and those without. 196 The
frequency of comorbid diagnoses indicates the overlapping nature of the
paraphilias197 and signifies vast heterogeneity within DSM disorders—
meaning that persons with quite different profiles can be assigned the
same paraphilic diagnosis.198 It becomes understandable why studies of
interrater reliability (degree of agreement among different raters) show
extremely poor statistics for paraphilias. 199 In an effort to explain this
lack of reliability, a psychiatrist with experience as a member of the
working groups that developed DSM-III-R and DSM-IV observes that
[T]here is a natural tendency. . .to focus on making
changes aimed at broadening the diagnostic umbrella of
their assigned categories with the goal of increasing
diagnostic coverage, i.e., reducing what they consider to
be false negatives, an effort which inevitably comes at
195. Jackson & Hess, supra note 137, at 427; Richard B. Krueger et al, Sexual and
Other Axis I Diagnoses of 60 Males Arrested for Crimes Against Children Involving the
Internet, 14 PRIMARY PSYCHIATRY 623 (2009).
196. Moser & Kleinplatz, supra note 39, at 96.
197. Graham Mellsop & Shailesh Kumar, Classification and Diagnosis in
Psychiatry: The Emperor’s Clothes Provide Illusory Court Comfort, 14 PSYCHIATRY
PSYCHOL. & L. 95, 97 (2007).
198. Stephen J. Morse, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 885, 889 (2011).
199. The relevant statistic is the kappa coefficient. When the diagnosis can lead to
significant infringement on the liberty of the individual involved, a suggested kappa of at
least .9 (i.e., ninety percent rater agreement) should be expected. Jill S. Levenson,
Reliability of Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment Criteria in Florida, 28 LAW &
HUMAN BEHAV. 357, 363–64 (2004) (considering a kappa coefficient of .75 good, and
citing prior studies with kappas of .30 sexual sadism, .36 paraphilia NOS, .47
exhibitionism, .65 pedophilia); W.L. Marshall, Diagnostic Issues, Multiple Paraphilias,
and Comorbid Disorders in Sexual Offenders: Their Incidence and Treatment, 12
AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 16, 18 (2007) (reporting studies with kappas of .65
pedophilia, .30 sexual sadism, .47 exhibitionism, .36 paraphilia NOS).
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the cost of increasing false positives.200
Part IV below develops the argument that the paraphilias, as
scientific concepts, are a poor fit for important legal decisions as they
have been reengineered to support the SVP law model that conflates sex
crimes with mental disease. As a prerequisite for understanding such an
argument, it is important to delineate how the vagueness in two
diagnostic criteria of the paraphilia group has permitted mental health
experts to substantiate affirmative diagnoses, despite significant
reliability issues and the likelihood of false positives.
1. Criterion A: Abnormal Sexual Arousal Pattern
Criterion A generally concerns the individual’s unusual “fantasies,
sexual urges, or behaviors.”201 Because behaviors are detached with the
“or” designation, many assessors have decoupled behaviors from the
sexually arousing fantasies and sexual urges. Many forensic evaluators
are thereby making a DSM paraphilia diagnosis without providing valid
evidence to justify the diagnosis. Instead, they infer from the criminal
sexual behavior the existence in the offender of the requisite “deviant
sexual arousal pattern (i.e., recurrent, intense, sexually arousing fantasies
and urges) that is the defining feature of a paraphilia.”202 Such inference
may be unjustified. The fact that one can sexually function during a rape,
for example, “provides no specific information about what is going on in
his mind vis-à-vis the focus of his sexual arousal pattern during the
act.”203 Thus, the likelihood of false positives is high if the forensic
examiner predicates the diagnosis on the mere commission of a criminal
sexual offense without also establishing a causal link between the
behavior and a paraphilic arousal pattern. 204
Evaluators compound any such errors if they disregard the
possibility that sexual behaviors had some cause other than a sexual
fantasy or mental disorder.205 Individual circumstances and experiences
200. Michael B. First, DSM-5 Proposals for Paraphilias: Suggestions for Reducing
False Positives Related to Use of Behavioral Manifestations, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAV. 1239, 1239 (2010) (citation omitted).
201. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.81, at 570.
202. First & Halon, supra note 98, at 444.
203. Id. at 446.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 445.
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or cultural and social factors may drive behaviors.206 The offender may
be acting out in a sexualized manner for other reasons, such as
antisociality, alcohol-induced disinhibition, opportunity,207 or a medical
condition (such as Alzheimer’s disease). 208
2. Criterion B: Significant Impairment
Mental health examiners now often also capitalize on a wording
glitch existing in Criterion B, at least for those paraphilias specifically
involving nonconsenting persons (i.e., pedophilia, sexual sadism,
voyeurism, exhibitionism, and frotteurism). 209 For them, the DSM-IV-TR
indicates that Criterion B can be met if the behavior, urges, or fantasies
cause significant impairment, or, alternatively, if the person acted upon
them. 210 This appears to permit a diagnosis based on behavior alone,
without also requiring that the urges cause the individual significant
dysfunction or impairment. The Chair and Editor responsible for wording
changes in the DSM-IV edition publicly acknowledge the problematic
wording as simple errors that, in retrospect, the Chair and Editor have
come to appreciate have contributed to misuse of the paraphilia
section.211 Instead, there is a more simple explanation behind the wording
in Criterion B, and it relates specifically to pedophilia. When the APA
initially issued the DSM-IV (before the text revision), it did not include
the alternative of acting on the urges for the nonconsenting-type
206. Alexander Tsesis, Due Process in Civil Commitments, 68 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 253, 294–95 (2011).
207. First, supra note 200, at 1242-43; First & Halon, supra note 98, at 449; see
also Smid et al., supra note 185, at 180 (indicating studies show a “majority of sex
offenders do not seem to have an explicit preference for illegal sexual interactions”);
Vernon L. Quinsey, Pragmatic and Darwinian Views of the Paraphilias, 41 ARCHIVES
SEXUAL BEHAV. 217 (2011) (arguing that pedophilia is inapplicable if the sexual contact
with a child resulted from a “long-term strategy for obtaining an adult partner or . . .
misapprehension of age”).
208. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 202; see also Drew A. Kingston et al.,
Comparing Indicators of Sexual Sadism as Predictors of Recidivism Among Adult Male
Sexual Offenders, 78 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 574, 581 (2010) (regarding
sexual sadism, the import is whether “violence is intended to cause physical suffering that
is sexually arousing to the offender, as opposed to other possible motivations (e.g.,
gratuitous violence because the offender is angry at the victim)”).
209. Allen Frances & Michael B. First, Hebephilia Is Not a Mental Disorder in
DSM-IV-TR and Should Not Become One in DSM-5, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
78, 80 (2011).
210. See id.
211. Id.
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paraphilias.212 Simply, Criterion B then required that the behavior, sexual
urges, or fantasies cause significant distress or impairment to the
individual.213 This quickly turned into public relations nightmare for the
APA because it prevented an evaluator from diagnosing an individual
with pedophilia if he was not distressed about his sexual interest in
children. 214 The concern had been that some egosyntonic individuals who
act upon their pedophilic urges are not distressed. 215
Consequently, in the text revision (DSM-IV-TR), the authors
modified the wording so that acting upon the sexual urges would be
sufficient for Criterion B for pedophilia, though they made a broader
extension as well as the other paraphilias involving nonconsenting
victims.216 In their own defense, the Chair and Editor of DSM-IV-TR
contend that they had not anticipated the development of SVP laws, the
role paraphilias would play in legal proceedings, or the significant harm
resulting to many so diagnosed. 217
Even diagnosticians who continue to incorporate the requirement of
distress or impairment to adjudge Criterion B often conflate its existence
with the criminal justice consequences that the individual suffered, such
as his arrest or incarceration, as a result of committing sexual offenses. 218
Arguably, the DSM itself suggests this connection. At first, the DSM
expresses that a “[p]araphilia must be distinguished from the
nonpathological use of sexual fantasies, behaviors, or objects as a
stimulus for sexual excitement in individuals without a [p]araphilia.” 219
But then it explores what may qualify as dysfunction: “Fantasies,
behaviors, or objects are paraphilic only when they lead to clinically

212. Hinderliter, supra note 167, at 251.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 202 (“Some constituencies were outraged that
these criteria seemed to give the ego-syntonic well-functioning paraphilic a free pass as
far as disorder goes, even in such cases as the compulsive repetitive pedophile.”).
216. Frances & First, supra note 209, at 80-81.
217. Id. at 79-81.
218. This is evident in case law. E.g., Sigman v. Rogers, No. 07-1383(DMC), 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71127, at *22 (D.N.J. Sept. 3, 2008) (finding social impairment since
imprisoned twice); United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1152 (D. Haw.
2008) (noting impairment by being incarcerated thrice); People v. Hardin, 932 N.E.2d
1016, 1026 (Ill. 2010) (finding impairment based on prior convictions); People v.
Willmes, No. H034656, 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9444, at *11 (Ct. App. Nov. 30,
2010) (indicating repeated incarcerations caused impairment by keeping defendant from
leading a normal life).
219. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2.
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significant distress or impairment (e.g., are obligatory, result in sexual
dysfunction, require participation of nonconsenting individuals, lead to
legal complications, interfere with social relationships).”220
3. What Constitutes Paraphilia “Not Otherwise Specified”?
There are additional diagnostic challenges in the enigma of the
paraphilia NOS residual. The “ambiguity has led to the distressing
situation of the defining of paraphilia NOS by the idiosyncratic,
unreliable, and untrustworthy standard of ‘you know it when you see
it.’”221 Its vagary is evident in many case opinions. In a notably oblique
summary, an expert testified in a case in which the defendant was civilly
committed that “[p]araphilia is a sexual disorder. Not otherwise specified
means that I’m not able to be more specific.” 222 In another case, the
opinion described the expert as indicating that “NOS was a type of
paraphilia that was nonspecific and was a term that was used to describe
general inappropriate sexual impulsivity.”223 Rather defensively, another
testifying expert averred that the “DSM can’t possibly list all of the
different potential . . . paraphilic diagnosis that are present out there,
there’s a multitude.”224 Conversely, the defense expert in another case
represented the NOS residual in political ideology, asserting that it was
“a way for the [DSM] authors to cover themselves in case a new sexual
appetite develops.”225 Several experts testified that paraphilia NOS was a
residual category for less frequently occurring paraphilias, 226 a concept

220. Id. (emphasis added).
221. Frances & First, supra note 209, at 80.
222. In re Grinstead, No. 09-07-00412-CV, 2008 WL 5501164, at *3 (Tex. Ct.
App. Jan. 15, 2009); see also People v. Pederson, No. A115239, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 9962, at *16-17 (Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2007) (noting expert testified NOS means no
specific diagnosis exists within the DSM independently).
223. People v. Bailey, 937 N.E.2d 731, 737 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
224. In re A.M., 2010 ND 163, ¶ 4, 787 N.W.2d 752, 754 (2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (expert explaining DSM’s failure to include paraphilia NOS-nonconsent).
225. Commonwealth v. Rossmeisl, No. 1952-05, 2006 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. LEXIS
285, at *12 (Aug. 16, 2006); see also People v. Hughes, No. H022186, 2003 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 6761, at *79 (Ct. App. July 11, 2003) (noting expert described NOS as
any paraphilia that does not fit the specific categories).
226. E.g., United States v. Carta, 620 F. Supp. 2d 210, 224 (D. Mass. 2009); In re
Orozco, No. CV08-5504 AHM (CT), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108797, at *25 (D. Cal.
Dec. 3, 2008); In re Dahl, No. 96,728, 2007 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 72, at *4 (Ct. App.
Sept. 21, 2007); Commonwealth v. Rossmeisl, No. 1952-05, 2006 PA. Dist. & Cnty. Dec.
LEXIS 285, at *9, 12 (Aug. 16, 2006).
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recognized in the DSM.227 The chimera of such a diagnosis did not seem
to trouble judges considering that many case opinions mentioned a
diagnosis of paraphilia NOS generally, without further specifying the
particular abnormal sexual interest.228
Because of the lack of standards, assessors seem to not reserve
paraphilia NOS just for unique or newly recognized sexual interests.
Observers witnessed the unparsimonious lumping of disparate behaviors
into a single paraphilia NOS diagnosis:
Most professionals in this field have seen evaluators
connect separate types of offenses (one rape and one
report of targeted masturbation in prison) to establish a
single paraphilia diagnosis, or an act and an inferred
fantasy (one rape and past bondage games with a
consenting girlfriend) to establish a paraphilia. If,
however, even under the most rigorous scrutiny there is
no paraphilia, this implies that there is no basis to infer
sexually deviant fantasies, thoughts, or behaviors in the
offender’s criminal or personal history. Instead, what is
in the offender’s history is general criminality with a
sexual crime contained within it.229
The following is offered as another example:
[E]valuators will take a Lewd and Lascivious act in the
presence of a minor and a sexual assault on an adult
many years later; connect the two and diagnose
Paraphilia NOS (non-consent). Therefore, under the
current conditions of sex offender screening, the acts

227. But this view makes the use of paraphilia NOS for hebephilia problematic. See
infra Part III.C.
228. E.g., United States v. Roderick, No. 2:10-CR-741-DCN, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 81086, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2011); Jennings v. Rogers, No. 06-5025 (JLL),
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36787, at *9 (D.N.J. May 2, 2008); In re Brady, No. 09-0900360-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 4502, at *8, *13 (Ct. App. June 16, 2011); In re
Grinstead, No. 09-07-004120CV, 2008 WL 5501164, at *3 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 15,
2009); People v. O’Shell, 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 57, 60 (Ct. App. 2009); In re Allison, 2005 WI
App 1, ¶ 9, 277 Wis. 2d 873, 690 N.W.2d 884 (Ct. App. 2004).
229. Dean R. Cauley, The Diagnostic Issue of Antisocial Personality Disorder in
Civil Commitment Proceedings: A Response to DeClue, 35 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 475, 493
(2007).
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don’t even need to be necessarily similar in nature, but
must merely have a non-consenting victim. 230
This type of aggregation was represented in a legal case where the state
expert described a “plethora of sexual deviancy that comes together” for
the diagnosis of paraphilia NOS, citing to sexual interactions with
prepubescent children and animals, an aggressive sexual act with a
nineteen-year-old, and acts involving masochism, frotteurism, and
exhibitionism. 231
From a scientific perspective it should be obvious that “[t]o the
extent that this category [of not otherwise specified] becomes a wastebasket for sex offenders, it is taxonomically useless (i.e., it provides no
discrimination).”232 Experts assert that, in practice, clinicians worryingly
overuse paraphilia NOS.233
C.

Constructing Arousal to Teenagers as Deviant: Hebephilia

The issues of what is normatively deviant and the lack of diagnostic
specificity in the paraphilias have led to an emerging controversy in the
forensic science field and the courts. This involves the use of a new
category of paraphilia involving sexual interest or behaviors toward
minors that are older or more sexually mature (physically) than the group
currently covered by the DSM’s version of pedophilia. The prevailing
moniker is hebephilia, a term constructed from the Greek word ephebos,
meaning “one arrived at puberty.”234
There is little consensus about hebephilia. Even those who advocate
hebephilia as a recognized mental disorder, disagree about what level of
sexual maturity is involved (e.g., early pubescence, pubescence, or
postpubescence) or what numerical age group, if any, should be
included. There is also disagreement among them as to whether it should
best be addressed as an extension of pedophilia or in the paraphilia NOS

230. Id. at 494.
231. In re Grinstead, 2008 WL 5501164, at *3.
232. Prentky et al., supra note 27, at 367.
233. Cauley, supra note 229, at 493–94 (“The recent over application of the
Paraphilia NOS diagnosis in this field has reached the level where any two sexual
offenses in the offender’s history, no matter what the nature of the individual acts, will
result in an NOS diagnosis.”); Marshall, supra note 199, at 20.
234. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 45. Alternative names are hebophilia,
ephebophilia, phebophilia, and Lolita Syndrome. Id.
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residual. The argument for the latter is that paraphilia NOS includes
interest in nonconsenting persons and thereby hebephilia is covered since
it involves persons who generally cannot legally consent. The paraphilas
working group for the upcoming DSM-5 have vacillated on the proposed
definition, though they are working with it as a change to pedophilia.
Analogizing to pedophilia is problematic considering the
prepubescence required by the former is vastly different in sexual
maturity than pubescence. Pubescence can trigger normal sexual interest
from a statistical perspective. 235 As examples, normal desires can be
triggered in these hypotheticals:
Individuals who harbor unrealistic Romeo-and-Juliet
visions of young love, individuals who routinely have
access to and find themselves sexually stimulated by
young females or males (e.g., junior high school
teachers, priests), individuals attracted to “forbidden
fruit” or preoccupied with sexual purity, individuals who
are predatory and see young girls and boys as easily
seduced and thus a target of opportunity hard to resist,
and many others may be inclined in their fantasies and
possibly their actions to prefer pubescent targets for their
desires. 236
To the extent that a reason to find attraction to prepubescent children
deviant as it does not foster procreative goals, it is noted that from a
Darwinian perspective, attraction to pubescence could have reproductive
value considering pubertal girls have the potential of many offspring in
the future.237
Hebephilia, therefore, violates a basic principle underlying the
paraphilias. They were meant to apply only to that which is unusual or
bizarre, and attraction to pubescent or postpubescent individuals is
neither.238 There is much research that supports the conclusion that many
nonoffending men are sexually attracted to pubescent individuals,
indicating it is definitively within the range of normality. 239 In addition,
various studies show that many men in the community have sexual
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
Wakefield, supra note 64, at 206.
Quinsey, supra note 207.
Frances & First, supra note 209, at 83.
Id. at 84.
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fantasies or behaviors involving youth of various ages. 240
Critics likewise contend that there is scant research on whether
sexual interest in pubescent or post-pubescent youth is pathological and
question why it is supposedly so fundamentally deviant that it deserves
stigmatic labeling and ostracization. A commentator has suggested that
including hebephilia in the DSM is extremely premature from a scientific
perspective, as a “full understanding of [hebephilia] would require
consulting experts and research from psychology, sexology, evolutionary
biology, ethology, anthropology, and sociology.” 241 The commentator
has gone on to suggest that
The lack of research interest in pedohebephilia is
breathtaking in light of the extreme societal concern over
adults and adolescents who interact sexually with
children, and considering that [five percent] or more of
males (over [five] million adults and 600,000 teenagers
in the U.S.) may be preferentially attracted to children. 242

240. See generally John Briere & Marsha Runtz, University Males’ Sexual Interest
in Children: Predicting Potential Indices of “Pedophilia” in a Nonforensic Sample, 13
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 65 (1989) (surveying 193 male university students, finding
nine percent reported fantasizing about sex with a young child, five percent masturbating
to fantasies of sex with children, and seven percent likely to have sex with a child if
assured they would not be caught or punished); Claude Crépault & Marcel Couture,
Men’s Erotic Fantasies, 9 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 565 (1980) (sampling ninety-four
men, finding sixty-two percent reported fantasizing about sexually initiating with a with a
young girl and three percent with a young boy); Terrel L. Templeman & Ray D. Stinnett,
Patterns of Sexual Arousal and History in a “Normal” Sample of Young Men, 20
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 137 (1991) (surveying sixty college men where five percent
expressed an interest in sex with a girl under twelve); Mary Ellen Fromuth et al., Hidden
Child Molestation: An Investigation of Adolescent Perpetrators in a Nonclinical Sample,
6 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 376, 379-80 (1991) (finding three percent of college men
reported having a sexual experience with a child when they were age sixteen or over);
T.P. Smith, Effects of the Child’s Relative Age Appearance and Attractiveness on
Vulnerability to Pedosexual Interactions, U. MICROFILMS INT’L, 1993, at 54.(reporting
three percent of sample of 183 male college students on condition of anonymity had
sexual contact with a prepubescent girl age twelve or younger and eleven percent with a
girl twelve to fifteen when they were over eighteen).
241. Richard Kramer, APA Guidelines Ignored in Development of Diagnostic
Criteria for Pedohebephilia, 40 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 233, 233 (2011).
242. Id. (citation omitted). The paraphilias subgroup ignores DSM research agenda
development issues, including developmental issues concerning pedohebephilia since
attraction to children develops during childhood. Id.
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Despite hebephilia not yet being formally incorporated in the DSM,
many mental health experts, as well as most courts in which it has been
at issue, have already accepted it as a proper diagnosis. The confusion
and lack of diagnostic criteria, however, are represented in the various
definitions experts have given in legal proceedings. Case opinions show
that mental health experts have described hebephilia as involving sexual
interest in adolescents 243 and, similarly, as involving sexual interest in
“underage individuals though they are not considered children [such as
adolescents].”244 However, other versions emphasize post-pubescence, 245
including interest in “post-pubescent adolescents, i.e., teenagers or
minors having secondary . . . characteristics.” 246 One depiction expressly
tied it to a legal definition: the expert defined hebephilia as sexual
interest in post-pubescent children below the age of consent. 247 Still other
accounts appear to ignore sexual maturity and are simply age-based, such
as delineating hebephilia to include interest in children older than
thirteen,248 children between thirteen to sixteen years of age, 249 and,
finally, “young teens to . . . about age [seventeen].”250 In sum, the
definitions in case law are disparate, defining hebephilia in terms of stage
of sexual maturity, age ranges, and legal age of consent.

243. United States v. Graham, 683 F. Supp. 2d 129, 142 (D. Mass. 2010); United
States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); State v. Rachel, 2010 WI
App 60, ¶ 21, 324 Wis.2d 465, 782 N.W. 2d 443 (Ct. App. 2010); In re Ayers, No.
37822-1-II, 2010 Wash. App. LEXIS 647, at *1 (Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2010); In re Miller,
No. 6-324 / 05-1453, 2006 Iowa App. LEXIS 720, at *3 (Ct. App. July 12, 2006); but see
Donaghe v. State, No. 31144-5-II, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 1943, at *6 (Ct. App. Aug. 3,
2005) (analogizing hebephilia to pedophilia but involving adolescents).
244. In re Williams, 253 P.3d 327, 330 (Kan. 2011).
245. E.g., In re E.J.S., No. A-0696-06T2, 2007 WL 1038894, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Apr. 9, 2007); In re Navratil, 799 N.W.2d 643, 648 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
246. United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1150–51 (D. Haw. 2008).
247. In re A.H.B., 898 A.2d 1027, 1030 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006).
248. In re Dahl, No. 96,728, 2007 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 72, at *4 (Ct. App.
Sept. 21, 2007).
249. Commonwealth v. Connolly, No. 05-1059C, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 77, at
*4 (Ct. App. Div. Feb. 3, 2006). In some cases experts testified that a hebephilia
diagnosis applied even though the sexual activities with minors appeared consensual if
not for their age. In re Navratil, 799 N.W.2d at 653 (Randall, J., dissenting) (calling it
statutory rape with “women slightly younger”); In re Miller, No. 6-324 / 05-1453, 2006
Iowa App. LEXIS 720, at *4 (Ct. App. July 12, 2006) (noting expert characterizing it as
defendant’s inability to resist an adolescent who approaches); Commonwealth v.
Plucinski, 868 A.2d 20, 27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (referring to defendant’s actions with
14-year-old stepdaughter as being a sexual surrogate and situational).
250. United States v. Carta, 620 F. Supp. 2d 210, 225 n.166 (D. Mass. 2009)
(alteration in original).
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In many cases, the expert linked the hebephilia diagnosis generally
to paraphilia NOS.251 These included “paraphilia, underage males” 252 or
paraphilia NOS with post-pubescent boys.253 In a sentencing hearing in a
case for child pornography, the diagnosis was quite specific: “Paraphilia
NOS Attraction to [and] Viewing of Sexually Explicit Images of PostPubescent Adolescent Females.”254 In another case the court added
supervised release conditions based, in part, on the diagnosis of
paraphilia NOS “involving pornography and teenage girls.”255 In a
particularly strong advocacy for the significance of hebephilia, the expert
asserted that it was causally related to the defendant’s past offending and
to his likelihood of recidivism. 256
The proponents of hebephilia face strong opposition. Legal
challenges to its use in court proceedings are considered in the next Part.
Furthermore, certain mental health experts worry that the field of
psychiatry loses credibility by asserting, for instance, that a nineteenyear-old who prefers sex with a fourteen-year-old has a mental
disorder257 or, regardless of an age difference, in treating attraction to a
developed fourteen-year-old the same as attraction to a prepubescent tenyear-old.258 Indeed, in many countries, including in Europe, an adult

251. In re Williams, 253 P.3d 327, 330 (Kan. 2011) (paraphilia NOS with
hebephilic tendencies with adolescents); In re Johnson, No. A11–792, 2011 Minn. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 902, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2011); In re Dahl, No. 96,728, 2007
Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 72, at *3 (Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2007); In re E.J.S., No. A-069606T2, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2992, at *4 (Ct. App. Div. Apr. 9, 2007); In re
Miller, No. 6-324/05-1453, 2006 Iowa App. LEXIS 720, at *3 (Ct. App. July 12, 2006);
see also In re M.N.A., No. A-4354-09T2, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3036, at *6
(Ct. App. Div. Dec. 17, 2010) (involving expert who gave a plethora of NOS diagnoses,
including depressive disorder NOS, impulse control disorder NOS, and personality
disorder NOS).
252. Berg v. Missouri, 342 S.W.3d 374, 380 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
253. Sigman v. Rogers, No. 07-1383(DCM), 2008 WL 4104447, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept.
3 , 2008).
254. Walker v. United States, No. 7:09-CV-90060, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108981,
at *48 (M.D. Ga. May 24, 2010).
255. United States v. Blauvelt, No. WDQ-08-0269, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87060,
at *13 (D. Md. Oct. 28, 2008).
256. United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1151 (D. Haw. 2008).
257. Richard Wollert & Elliot Cramer, Sampling Extreme Groups Invalidates
Research on the Paraphilias: Implications for DSM-5 and Sex Offender Risk
Assessments, 29 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 554, 555 (2011); Richard Green, Hebephilia is a
Mental Disorder?, SEXUAL OFFENDER TREATMENT, http://www.sexual-offendertreatment.org/2-2010_01.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
258. Howard Zonana, Sexual Disorders: New and Expanded Proposals for the
DSM-5–Do We Need Them?, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 245, 248 (2011).
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having voluntary sexual relations with a fourteen-year-old is legal. 259
These issues, along with the likelihood that most sex with pubescent
teenagers, and much of it with younger children, is more opportunistic, 260
means a high probability of many false positive diagnoses of mental
disorder.261 One commentator summarized the situation thusly:
“Diagnosing hebephilic behavior as mental disorder brushes aside
common patterns of psychosexual development, sidesteps cultural
influences on sexuality, ignores historic precedents, insults much of
Europe and elsewhere that legalizes sex with [fourteen] year olds, or
younger, and attempts to insinuate psychiatry as an agent of social
control.”262
IV. Reframing Sex Crimes as Mental Disease
The law’s utilization of psychiatric diagnoses in the application of
policies to control those sexual offenders perceived as dangerous
continues despite significant normative and scientific challenges. Is the
charge true that psychiatry is being used as a “prop of legitimacy” for
SVP laws?263 The desert-disease model has in some ways benefited the
mental health field where it has resulted in a “cottage industry and
generated two partisan advocacy expert camps” in providing forensic
evaluations.264 The partisanship is related not only to the adversarial
259. See generally Worldwide Ages of Consent, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/ageof-consent.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). The age of consent in twenty European
countries is under sixteen. Id.; Emily J. Stine, When Yes Means No, Legally: An Eighth
Amendment Challenge to Classifying Consenting Teenagers as Sex Offenders, 60
DEPAUL L. REV. 1169, 1208 (2011).
260. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 204. “What would motivate a man who is
attracted to adult women (i.e., gynephilic) to approach a young girl for sex?” Amy D.
Lykins et al., Sexual Arousal to Female Children in Gynephilic Men, 22 SEXUAL ABUSE
279, 280 (2010). Researchers studied 214 men referred to a Toronto sexual addiction
center and classified as gynephilic. Id. at 282–85. While on average tests showed greatest
arousal to adult females, there was also a significant response to pubescent, even
prepubescent, females. Id. at 285. The authors find this of interest as nothing in their
background suggested sexual interest other than to adult females. Id. The researchers
conclude that results support the theory gynephilic men may molest girls as substitutes
for their main preference. Id. at 287.
261. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 204.
262. Green, supra note 257.
263. Eric S. Janus, Sexually Violent Predator Laws: Psychiatry in Service of a
Morally Dubious Enterprise, 364 MED. CRIME & PUNISHMENT 50, 50 (2004).
264. John Matthew Fabian, Paraphilias and Predators: The Ethical Application of
Psychiatric Diagnoses in Partisan Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment
Proceedings, 11 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 82, 82 (2011) [hereinafter Fabian,
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nature of the law but also to the vagary in applying the DSM’s criteria
for paraphilias. Skeptics of the use of paraphilias in the law have charged
that the “tolerance of the legal system for nonstandard and nonauthoritative diagnoses suggests strongly that the legal system’s reliance
on diagnostic testimony is largely pretextual.”265 It serves their mutual
interests by labeling sexual offenders as mentally ill and also dangerous,
therefore deserving severe punishment and preventive detention. It could
be that the DSM’s categorization provides clinicians and legal actors
comfort by acknowledging that the diagnoses exist. 266 Yet, as explained
in this Article, it appears a false comfort considering the negative
consequences to the defendants involved and the potential waste of
governmental and treatment resources in the process. In sum, because the
paraphilias are normatively questionable and scientifically unsound, they
provide a poor fit for answering legal questions that intrude significantly
upon civil rights.
A.

Pretextuality

The previous section demonstrated that practitioners have employed
much diagnostic flexibility with the DSM criteria in a manner that serves
the desert-disease model for controlling sexual offenders. A crucial
inquiry is whether the law-psychiatry interface here has become so
entangled that bad science is going unrecognized in legal forums. A
prominent critic of the use of the DSM’s unscientific paraphilias in SVP
law decisions observes: “For reasons that were unanticipated just a few
decades ago, the precise definitions of the paraphilias have become
entwined with the attempt to prevent such harm to the public from the
individuals illegally acting out certain paraphilic desires.”267 Despite
significant flaws in the science underlying the designation of paraphilic
disorders, two constituencies, at least, are incentivized to maintain their
utility: criminal justice officials and forensic evaluators. The legal and
forensic psychiatry disciplines have certainly allied in using the specter
of mental disease to control sexually deviant offenders. But they have
done so decidedly in favor of prosecutorial interests. Professionals
Paraphilias and Predators].
265. Robert A. Prentky et al., Commentary: Muddy Diagnostic Waters in the SVP
Courtroom, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 455, 457 (2008) [hereinafter Prentky et
al., Muddy Diagnostic Waters].
266. Mellsop & Kumar, supra note 197, at 96.
267. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 196.
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engaged in the cross-disciplinary interface appear to have adopted a
phenomenological approach that has devolved into what social scientists
refer to as groupthink—that is, when a group’s desire for consensus
supersedes any realistic consideration of alternative theories or a
reevaluation of potential faults in its ideology. 268
Evidence of pretextuality in favor of prosecutorial interests is found
in the conflation of sexual crimes with psychiatric illness by using
criminal behavior as often the sole basis for a paraphilic diagnosis.
“Enterprising” forensic evaluators now rely upon criminally offensive
sexual behavior to fulfill both Criteria A (sexual preference) and B
(dysfunction).269 These diagnostic loopholes inappropriately lead to the
assignment of mental illness based primarily (or even solely) on repeated
sexual offenses considering many paraphilic-type acts are crimes.270 In
numerous case opinions, indeed, it often appears that the diagnosis for
paraphilia was based on past criminal sexual behaviors alone. 271 Multiple
problems result from this conflation. In psychological terms, this
represents what is empirically referred to as the logical fallacy of
affirming the consequent—that is, using the sexual offense to assume the
paraphilia (the antecedent). 272 It seems illogical, too, that when a
diagnosis is based on behavior, the behavior indicates a disorder even if
it benefits the individual.273 Such diagnosis may not, therefore, represent
any underlying pathology.274 The mere consequence that a sexual
268. See generally IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
STUDY OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (1972).
269. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 202; First, supra note 200, at 1240.
270. Krueger, Sexual Sadism, supra note 169, at 341; Moser & Kleinplatz, supra
note 39, at 98.
271. E.g., People v. Seja, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5474, at *35 (Ct. App.
July 22, 2011) (noting expert’s diagnosis supported by defendant’s prior crimes); In re
Conley, No. 09-10-00383-C.V, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 7877, at *4 (Ct. App. Sept. 29,
2011) (state expert basing paraphilia NOS on defendant’s sexual offenses against nonconsenting adults); People v. Hardin, 932 N.E.2d 1016, 1026 (Ill. 2010) (relying on three
sex offenses with non-consenting persons (teenagers) over five years); State v. Sugden,
2010 WI App 166, ¶ 6, 330 Wis.2d 628, 795 N.W.2d 456 (Ct. App. 2010) (relying on
details of defendant’s rapes and sexual aggression toward wife); People v. Runge, 917
N.E.2d 940, 949 (Ill. 2009) (basing sexual sadism on documented history of sexual
transgressions); People v. Torres, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 100 (Ct. App. 1999)
(“[d]efendant’s criminal history, according to both experts, demonstrates his
paraphilia.”).
272. First & Halon, supra note 98, at 446.
273. Moser & Kleinplatz, supra note 39, at 94.
274. Holly A. Miller et al., Sexually Violent Predator Evaluations: Empirical
Evidence, Strategies for Professionals, and Research Directions, 29 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 29, 39 (2005).
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behavior is illegal or that it may be socially distasteful should
forensically be irrelevant to the diagnostic evaluation.275
This manipulation of the DSM criteria thereby transforms immoral,
sexual conduct into mental disease.276 An example is when
diagnosticians use the paraphilia NOS category based almost solely on
the individual’s commission of multiple, yet disparate, sexual offenses.
Here, the diagnostician merely amalgamates various sex crimes and
infers a generic, wastebasket diagnosis. Such transformation has served
the disease model, in that repeated, or even the threat thereof of future,
behaviors becomes the disease component incorporated into SVP laws. 277
The potential for a slippery slope becomes apparent. Assuming virtually
all victims of sexual crimes are non-consenting, any individual who
commits more than one sex-based offense over six months apart, no
matter how disparate the behaviors or the motives, could theoretically be
diagnosed with paraphilia NOS.278
Diagnostic criteria that presumes that a paraphilia cannot go into
remission compounds these problems. 279 Again, the diagnosis may not
represent an underlying pathology but may be simply a descriptor of past
behavior and, importantly, presumptively unchanging behavior. 280 Any
history of sex offenses, no matter how far in the past, is transformed into
mental illness and assumed to be lifelong. This universal assumption of
chronicity and the pretextuality of the paraphilias manifest most often in
the diagnosis of mental disorder for child molesters and rapists.
B.

Child Molestation as Mental Disease

Pedophilia is perhaps the most commonly known paraphilia and the
one most likely to be recognized outside the mental health field. But this
also makes the paraphilia of pedophilia an area where law, science, and
common parlance collide. Often, the terms pedophile and child molester
are used interchangeably,281 as are pedophilia and the behavior of child

275. Moser & Kleinplatz, supra note 39, at 95.
276. Erickson, supra note 25, at 92–109; see also Erickson & Vitacco, supra note
43, at 8 (APA’s vision of mental disorder requires distress or disability; “mere social
deviance [being] insufficient”).
277. Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 366.
278. Prentky et al., supra note 27, at 367.
279. Miller et al., supra note 274, at 39.
280. Id.
281. HOLMES & HOLMES, supra note 77, at 110.
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molestation.282 This conflation of terms is problematic for various
reasons. It makes the pedophilic disorder intrinsically indistinguishable
from the crime. 283 And the diagnosis loses its connection to professional
skill and training. For instance, it has been suggested that virtually any
layperson can make the forensic diagnosis of pedophilia, even if the
diagnosis results in significant legal consequences: “Some legal experts
have suggested that pedophilia is so behaviorally explicit that anyone
could arrive at the diagnosis with an adequate record and a command of
the English language.”284
1. Issues of Reliability
Merging behavior with a diagnosis of pedophilia has contributed to
diagnostic flaws by ignoring the recurrent and intense sexual fantasies or
urges required by the DSM’s criteria. Essentially, the disorder of
pedophilia can fundamentally differ from child molestation in requiring a
psychological propensity—that is, a sexuo-erotic preference for
prepubescent children, whether acted upon or not. 285 Hence, it is critical
to reinforce the difference based on the sexual interest: those with
pedophilia have the sexual fantasies preferentially involving sexually
immature youth but may not molest them, while those who do sexually
assault young children may not have such a preference and thereby

282. United States v. Ardolf, 683 F.3d 894, 902 (8th Cir. 2012); Seto, supra note
76, at 164; Melissa Hamilton, The Child Pornography Crusade and its Net-Widening
Effect, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1679, 1693 (2012).
283. Zonana, supra note 258, at 246. Some criminal statutes expressly use the
terminology of pedophilia. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4205A (2010) (imposing additional
penalties for pedophile offenders); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-1 (2006) (codifying
crime of “criminal pedophilia”).
284. Miller et al., supra note 274, at 47; see United States v. Colin, 1:07-CR-512
(GLS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91409, at *11–12 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2007)
(acknowledging absence of a clinical diagnosis, but labeling defendant a pedophile based
on defendant’s sexually-charged interactions with 12-year-old girls).
285. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 47; Jennifer Jason, Note, Beyond No-Man’s
Land: Psychiatry’s Imprecision Revealed by its Critique of SVP Statutes as Applied to
Pedophilia, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1319, 1340 (2010) (observing experts improperly focus on
illegal behavior, already criminalized, and not assessing for sexual fantasies of pubescent
children). The psychiatric “bible” for the international psychiatry community specifically
requires the sexual preference to prepubertal or early puberty children. INTERNATIONAL
STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES AND RELATED HEALTH PROBLEMS, WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.
F65.4
(10th
rev.
2010),
available
at
http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2010/en#/F60-F69.
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should not be diagnosed as paraphilic.286 In simple terms,
(diagnostically-confirmed) pedophiles and (behaviorally-substantiated)
child molesters are not synonymous.287 Unfortunately, it is common
practice in forensic settings to fail to distinguish ordinary criminals from
those with pedophilia because the government is not proving the element
of a pattern of preferential arousal to children. 288 In one case, for
instance, the expert diagnosed the defendant with pedophilia based on
prior acts of sexual contact with children, as well as rape paraphilia for
past acts of raping adult women, explaining the dual diagnoses just
meant that defendant’s sexual interests were not exclusive. 289
Another empirical issue is that cause and effect are clouded by
conflating pedophilia and child molestation. 290 Logically, such a
conflation is the result of circular reasoning. One who molests a child has
pedophilia and vice versa. There is no way to empirically confirm or test
such an imputed relationship. It is contended, too, that while child
molestation is an immoral act, there is no medical evidence of it deriving
from a mental deficiency; rather, it is a social construction that
pedophilia is linked to a sick mind. 291 These grievances may help explain
why there is evidence that a DSM diagnosis of pedophilia does not
adequately measure a deviant arousal pattern to pubescent children.
Studies have shown that a DSM-based pedophilia diagnosis is not
correlated with phallometric indications of deviant arousal to pubescent
children. 292 Nor is a DSM diagnosis of pedophilia correlated with sexual

286. Joseph A. Camilleri & Vernon L. Quinsey, Pedophilia: Assessment and
Treatment, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE : THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT, supra note 50,
at 184; Marshall, supra note 199, at 20.
287. See Kerry Sheldon & Dennis Howitt, Sexual Fantasy in Paedophile Offenders:
Can Any Model Explain Satisfactorily New Findings from a Study of Internet and
Contact Sexual Offenders?, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 137, 153 (2008)
(finding in a small sample no association between fantasies with children and child
molestation).
288. Jason, supra note 285, at 1332.
289. People v. Hooker, 968 N.E.2d 1087, 1094 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
290. Camilleri & Quinsey, supra note 286, at 184.
291. HOLMES & HOLMES, supra note 77, at 30–45 (offering social learning,
psychological, and sociobiological explanations for pedophilia); Fred S. Berlin,
Commentary on Pedophilia Diagnostic Criteria in DSM-5, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 242, 243 (2011) (conceding that it is disingenuous to suggest pedophilia diagnosis in
the DSM is not based in part on value judgment); Erickson, supra note 25, at 114.
292. Wilson et al., supra note 177, at 268 (studying 130 convicted sex offenders
against children assessed at a sexual behavior clinic in Ontario). The authors note the lack
of a correlation “is puzzling, given that these would appear to be the two most common
means of diagnosing this condition.” Id. at 270.
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recidivism. 293 Actually, a study using a regression analysis method
indicates that a DSM diagnosis of pedophilia is not even a significant
predictor for sexual recidivism. 294 These results undermine the prevailing
risk-based model presumption that a diagnosis of pedophilia is an
appropriate proxy for risk assessment supporting legal decisions. Experts
likewise note that multiple studies show such low statistics for the
reliability and validity of DSM diagnoses of pedophilia that it should be
seriously questioned and construed to hold limited utility for
practitioners,295 and even more inappropriate for legal proceedings. 296
However, with the Supreme Court’s acceptance of pedophilia as a
qualifying mental disorder in the Hendricks civil commitment case, 297
there appears little hope for legal challenges by counsel in a trial
setting. 298
The reciprocal nature of the law-psychiatry interface manifests
strongly with regard to expanding diagnostic coverage from
prepubescent children to hebephilia, however it may be defined. Critics
contend that the recent exaltation of hebephilia is fundamentally based
on its forensic utility for the application of SVP laws. 299 Partisanship is
evident, as “for self-serving reasons, it is applauded by those who
generally work for the prosecution and criticized by those who generally
work for the defense.”300 Two other potential egocentric foundations
exist. One involves the composition of the DSM-5 paraphilias workgroup
293. Heather M. Moulden et al., Recidivism in Pedophiles: An Investigation Using
Different Diagnostic Methods, 20 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 680, 693 (2009)
(finding no difference in violent, sexual or general recidivism rates for extra-familial
child molesters diagnosed with pedophilia or not); Wilson et al., supra note 177, at 268.
294. Wilson et al., supra note 177, at 270; see also Moulden et al., supra note 293,
at 693 (finding DSM diagnosis of pedophilia was negatively correlated with recidivism).
But see United States v. Boroczk, 705 F.3d 616, 620-21 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting longer
sentence based in part on expert asserting that pedophilia correlates strongly and
positively with sexual recidivism).
295. Kingston et al., supra note 208, at 575; Moulden et al., supra note 293, at 698;
Wilson et al., supra note 177, at 270.
296. Marshall, supra note 199, at 16.
297. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
298. See, e.g., United States v. Lange, No. 5:08-HC-2070, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
159498, at *22-23 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 7, 2012) (finding pedophilia diagnosis supported
despite expert’s expressed discomfort that it be based solely on prior molestation).
299. Frances & First, supra note 209, at 79; see also Fabian, Diagnosing and
Litigating, supra note 94, at 501 (calling hebephilia a product of the “new-age” SVP
laws).
300. Robert Prentky & Howard Barbaree, Commentary: Hebephilia—A Would-be
Paraphilia Caught in the Twilight Zone Between Pubescence and Adulthood, 39 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 496, 508 (2011).
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proposing that hebephilia be formally adopted as a subset of pedophilia.
The chair is the author of several studies on which the workgroup is
basing the purported empirical support for hebephilia. 301 All four
members of the workgroup would also appear to be incentivized to reach
such a conclusion, considering they are specialists in sex offender
treatment services,302 for which broadening diagnostic coverage would
benefit. The second potential conflict regards another prominent
promoter of hebephilia (as a subspecies of paraphilias NOS) who
strongly advocates the diagnosis in an influential instruction manual he
authored and aptly titled, Evaluating Sex Offenders: A Manual for Civil
Commitments and Beyond.303 The latter’s influence is clear, as the author
has testified supporting hebephilia as a proper diagnosis in numerous
SVP court proceedings.304
A vocal opponent calls hebephilia the DSM-5 workgroup’s “most
flawed and blatantly overpathologizing paraphilia proposal.” 305 There are
several criticisms about the hebephilia diagnosis that expressly relate to
the law-psychiatry interface. Clearly, the proposal to expand pedophilia
conflates law enforcement with mental illness. 306 The inclusion of
hebephilia seems simply to cater to the interests of criminal justice
officials. 307 If the reason that sexual interest in a group (children) or
object is a mental disorder is that they are illegal, this reasoning seriously
comingles the professional realms of psychiatry and the law. 308 The tie of
301. Karen Franklin, Hebephilia: Quintessence of Diagnostic Pretextuality, 28
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 751, 765 (2010) (suggesting chair using the post to lobby for the
disorder which will “shape … forensic diagnosis of sex offenders for some time to
come”); Kramer, supra note 241, at 233 (noting of the thirty-four studies cited in support
ten co-authored by chair). But see James M. Cantor, The Errors of Karen Franklin’s
Pretextuality, 11 INT’L J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 59 (2012).
302. Kramer, supra note 241, at 233 (of the thirty-four studies cited, thirty-one are
from a sex offender management perspective).
303. Franklin, supra note 301, at 760. The book is considered the bible for forensic
evaluators in sex offender civil commitments. Thomas Zander, Commentary: Inventing
Diagnosis for Civil Commitment of Rapists, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 459, 460
(2008).
304. E.g., United States v. Shields, No. 07-12056-PBS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13837, at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2008); United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1145,
1150 (D. Haw. 2008); In re Miller, No. 6-324, 05-1553, 2006 Iowa App. LEXIS 720, at
*3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 12, 2006); In re Risdal, No. 6-305, 05-0739, 2006 Iowa App.
LEXIS 763, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 12, 2006); In re Atwood, No. 5-200, 03-1280,
2005 Iowa App. LEXIS 333, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2005).
305. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 206.
306. Zonana, supra note 258, at 247.
307. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 205.
308. Hinderliter, supra note 167, at 256–57.
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hebephilia to the law would also illogically render a diagnosis based on
the legal age of consent in the offender’s particular jurisdiction. A federal
district judge noticed this definitional problem:
The age of legal consent is of no use to psychologists
seeking a uniform diagnostic standard because the age of
consent varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It is one
thing to criminalize conduct in one state that is legal in
another. It is quite another to label a sexual interest
pathological in Pennsylvania and normal in New
York. 309
An academic has similarly remarked on the problem with correlating
disorder with the age of consent:
If a man with consistent patterns of sexual attraction to
[sixteen]- and [seventeen]-year-old girls lives in a state
where the age of consent is [sixteen] but works in a state
where the age of consent is [eighteen], defining [a
paraphilia] in terms of age of consent would mean that,
if this man meets a clinical significance criterion, his
mental disorder is cured everyday when he goes home
from work.310
Any incorporation of the legal age of consent would likewise defy the
APA’s basic requirement that the delineation of a particular mental
disorder should not be “primarily a result of social deviance or conflicts
with society.”311
2. Frye/Daubert Challenges
Numerous defendants have brought legal challenges to the diagnosis
of hebephilia, citing issues involving logic, normality, and science.
Several cases contain references to concessions that attraction to

309. United States v. Carta, 620 F. Supp. 2d 210, 224 (D. Mass. 2009) (footnote
omitted).
310. Andrew C. Hinderliter, Defining Paraphilia in DSM-5: Do Not Disregard
Grammar, 37 J. SEX & MARITAL THERAPY 17, 23–24 (2011) (footnote omitted).
311. Kramer, supra note 241, at 233.
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postpubescents is not abnormal.312 For example, in a case involving
sentencing for possession of child pornography, an expert testified that
hebephilia could not be a psychological abnormality considering normal
men are aroused by teenage girls.313 A federal court in another opinion
documented the expert’s characterization as follows:
[A]dults males to respond to a psychosexually mature
young adolescent girl with the physical sexual
characteristics of an adult woman would not be regarded
as abnormal and unusual . . . . [T]hose images are used
all the time in advertising and marketing because it’s
understood that a sexually appealing adolescent is just
that, sexually appealing.314
Hebephilia would seem to be vulnerable under both the Frye and
Daubert tests for admitting scientific evidence315 based on lack of
general acceptance in the mental health field, while additionally subject
to attack under Daubert for having little support from peer-reviewed
studies, for having very low interrater reliability statistics, 316 and for
failing to follow the scientific method. Notwithstanding these
considerations, overall, defendants have rarely succeeded in court in
challenging a diagnosis based on hebephilia.317 Often the legal claim in
312. E.g., United States v. Shields, No. 07-12056-PBS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13837, at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2008); In re K.H., No. A-4375-09T2, 2010 N.J. Super.
Unpub. LEXIS 3032, at *7 (Ct. App. Div. Dec. 17, 2010); In re E.J.S., No. A-0696-06T2,
2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2992, at *5 (Ct. App. Div. Apr. 9, 2007).
313. United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). The expert
contended an entire area of sex offender literature has exploded around hebephilia: “It’s a
very, very, very controversial and hot area right now.” Id. at 458.
314. United States v. Wetmore, 766 F. Supp. 2d 319, 330 (D. Mass. 2011).
315. Frye is a common standard used to legally challenge whether new scientific
evidence is reliable, using a test of whether the evidence has been generally accepted in
the relevant scientific community. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Daubert is the common alternative, providing suggestions for a court to determine the
admissibility of expert evidence, including testability, peer review and publication,
methodological standards (including the error rate), and general acceptance. Daubert v.
Merrill Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).
316. Paul Good & Jules Burstein, Hebephilia and the Construction of a Fictitious
Diagnosis, 6 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 492, 493 (2012). The authors go on to state
that “from a societal standpoint, prematurely legitimizing another sexually dangerous
mental disorder may further contribute to the sexual panic now gripping the country, one
in which child molesters are more feared than terrorists.” Id. (citation omitted).
317. But see United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 1150–51 (finding it not
a serious mental disorder, with an emphasis on serious). Though the court in United
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commitment proceedings is one of insufficiency of evidence, the
argument being that hebephilia is factually inadequate to serve as a
qualifying mental disorder.318 One called it a “made up diagnosis,” 319
while defense counsel in another argued it was junk science. 320 A similar
challenge has been that it is an invalid diagnosis violating the Frye
standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence.321 Yet case law
indicates courts have almost universally accepted the diagnosis for legal
purposes,322 even when state experts conceded it was not specifically
contained within the DSM.323 In a representative state case, the defense
expert contended that recurrent sexual behavior directed at adolescents
could not qualify as a disorder of sexual appetite because the DSM’s
focus was on sexual maturity, not cognitive ability to consent; instead he
contended it was merely “bad behavior.”324 The court expressly rejected
States v. Carta describes the Abregana result differently, suggesting the basis of not
committing the defendant was on not finding the requisite future dangerousness. United
States v. Carta, 620 F. Supp. 2d 210, 226 (D. Mass. 2009). Other cases also have turned
not on the hebephilia diagnosis but on failing to find a likelihood to reoffend.
Commonwealth v. Connolly, No. 05-1059C, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 77, at *4 (Super.
Ct. Feb. 2, 2006); Commonwealth v. Plucinski, 868 A.2d 20, 27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
318. E.g., In re Johnson, No. A11-792, 2011 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 902, at
*10 (Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2011); Berg v. State, 342 S.W.3d 374, 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011);
In re M.N.A., No. A-4354-09T2, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3036, at *1 (Ct. App.
Div. Dec. 17, 2010); In re Miller, No. 6-324/05-1435, 2006 Iowa App. LEXIS 720, at *1
(Ct. App. July 12, 2006).
319. In re Dahl, No. 96,728, 2007 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 72, at *8 (Ct. App.
Sept. 21, 2007).
320. In re E.J.S., No. A-0696-06T2, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2992, at *5
(Ct. App. Div. Apr. 9, 2007).
321. In re Ayers, No. 3788-1-II, 2010 Wash. App. LEXIS 647, at *2 (Ct. App. Mar.
30, 2010).
322. E.g., State v. Alfredo M., 947 N.Y.S.2d 594, 595 (App. Div. 2012); In re
Hooker, 968 N.E.2d 1087, 1096 (Ill. Ct. App. 2012); In re C.E.G., No. A-1624-11T2,
2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1494, at *3 (Ct. App. Div. June 26, 2012); In re
Jacobson, No. A11-2176, 2012 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 320, at *12 (Ct. App. Apr. 23,
2012).
323. E.g., State v. Spencer D., 946 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182 (App. Div. 2012); In re
Johnson, No. A11-792, 2011 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 902, at *13 (Ct. App. Sept. 26,
2011); In re Dahl, No. 96,728, 2007 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 72, at *3 (Ct. App. Sept.
21, 2007); In re E.J.S., No. A-0696-06T2, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2992, at *5
(Ct. App. Div. Apr. 9, 2007); see also United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1145,
1153 (D. Haw. 2008) (conflicting testimony by defense experts where one indicates
hebephilia not in any important literature while another contradicted this and admitted to
having himself co-authored a chapter about its existence); Commonwealth v. Plucinski,
868 A.2d 20, 22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (indicating expert testified hebephilia may not be
itemized in the DSM but is promulgated in professional literature).
324. Commonwealth v. Rossmeisl, No. 1952-05, 2006 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec.
LEXIS 285, at *12 (Comm. Ct. Aug. 16, 2006).
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that depiction and, instead, countenanced the use of hebephilia as a
diagnosis for two reasons. For one, the court rejected the expert’s attempt
to link the DSM’s nonconsenting aspect to sexual immaturity since doing
so would effectively eliminate the DSM’s nonconsenting persons
alternative. 325 The second rationale was that rejecting hebephilia would
create a loophole for individuals to have sexual contact with adolescents,
but without the attribution of a disorder, they would not be eligible for
sexually violent predator status. However, such explanation is
concerning since the court appears to concede to the massaging of
psychiatric principles to justify a significant legal consequence.
Defendants have also attempted to convince federal judges that a
hebephilia diagnosis was a poor fit for legal questions bearing significant
consequences. Two federal district judges in Massachusetts have ruled to
exclude from evidence testimony about hebephilia. In one, Judge Patti
Saris (currently the chair of the United States Sentencing Commission)
granted a motion to exclude evidence of a diagnosis of hebephilia upon
finding the government had not shown that hebephilia was generally
accepted as a mental disorder by professionals who assess sexually
violent offenders.326 The following year, a colleague cited Judge Saris’s
opinion and similarly ruled in the case of United States v. Carta that a
diagnosis of hebephilia violated the Daubert standard of admissibility for
expert evidence, as it was not recognized by the psychiatric community
as a serious mental disorder.327 The Carta district judge was convinced
by the court-appointed expert’s contentions that hebephilia was not a
valid diagnosis, consistent criteria for assessment were unavailable, its
omission from the DSM showed it was not generally accepted, the
paraphilia diagnostic criteria referring to children assumes prepubescent
(not post-pubescent) youth, and normal adults find sexually mature
teenagers arousing.328 Further, the jurist criticized the diagnosis for
blurring the distinction between criminal conduct and pathological

325. Id. at *13 (suggesting not recognizing a disorder related to adolescents who
legally cannot consent is “illogical and at odds” with the DSM).
326. United States v. Shields, No. 07-12056-PBS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13837, at
*4 (1st. Cir. Feb. 26, 2008). The judge eventually approved the civil commitment based
on diagnosis of pedophilia. United States v. Shields, 597 F. Supp. 2d 224 (D. Mass.
2009).
327. United States v. Carta, 620 F. Supp. 2d 210, 225 n.166 (D. Mass. 2009).
328. Id. at 218. “Should an eighteen-year-old, for example, who is sexually
interested in a fifteen-year-old be treated the same as a fifty-year-old interested in the
same fifteen-year-old?” Id. at 224-25.
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illness. 329 But these rulings—that hebephilia was not an accepted mental
disorder for civil commitment purposes—was quickly reversed on appeal
by a First Circuit panel.330
The First Circuit panel overturning the lower court’s Carta decision
commented that a mental disorder need not be accepted by consensus in
the medical community to be legally sufficient for civil commitment
purposes and, in any event, it found there was sufficient evidence that a
hebephilia diagnosis could exist in the DSM’s paraphilia framework. 331
The panel interpreted the DSM paraphilia NOS criteria as broad enough
to apply to a fixation on teenagers. 332 On remand, the case was
reassigned to Judge Saris, who later adjudged the defendant eligible for
commitment based on hebephilia.333 Still seemingly concerned about
hebephilia capturing interest in older teens, she highlighted that the
experts in the case had limited their diagnostic specification to attraction
involving pubescent children ages eleven to fourteen.334 She appeared
influenced, in part, by the fact that the diagnosis with that age range was
under consideration for inclusion in DSM-5.335
Despite the First Circuit’s Carta decision, a federal district judge in
the Fourth Circuit has in several cases in 2012 ruled against the
introduction of hebephilia, determining that it is insufficient for civil
commitment purposes.336 The court credited the defense expert’s
testimony that the DSM does not actually list hebephilia, numerous
psychologists have rejected it, and arousal to pubescent and
postpubescent is not abnormal even if acting on it might violate the
329. Id. at 227.
330. United States v. Carta, 592 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2010).
331. Id. at 40. Another First Circuit panel has likewise ruled that “even if the issue
begins and ends with the DSM,” hebephilia is covered by the nonconsenting persons
language and the DSM does not otherwise exclude pubescent children as the focus of
attraction. United States v. Wetmore, 700 F.3d 570, 578 (4th Cir. 2012).
332. Id. at 41. The court cautioned that its decision did not mean everyone attracted
to sexually mature teenagers would be hebephiles since diagnosis requires additional
criteria. Id.
333. United States v. Carta, No. 07-12064-PBS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73007, at
*1 (D. Mass. 2011).
334. Id. at *33.
335. Id.
336. United States v. Shea, No. 5:11-HC-2136-BO, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94182,
at *12-13 (E.D.N.C. July 9, 2012); United States v. Caporale, No. 5:08-HC-2037-BO,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55794, at *8-9 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 20, 2012); United States v.
Hamelin, No. 5:09-HC-2028-BO, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54790, at *8 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 6,
2012); United States v. Neuhauser, No. 5:07-HC-2101-BO, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7008,
at *5-6 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 20, 2012).
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law. 337 Indeed, in one of these cases, the judge also summarily rejected
the state’s Daubert challenge to strike the defense expert’s testimony
thereon. 338 His decisions are important considering that his judicial
district is a primary jurisdictional venue for federal civil commitments. 339
Nonetheless, whatever victory these decisions may have held in favor of
rationally assessing the evidence here was short-lived. The Fourth Circuit
reversed at least one of these decisions, soundly rejecting that hebephilia
as a matter of law cannot qualify as a mental impairment justifying civil
commitment.340 Citing, in part, the First Circuit’s Carta opinion, the
appellate panel concluded that
[t]hough his condition may elude definitive labeling, the
evidence at hearing established that [defendant’s] ability
to function normally in society has been preempted by
his sexual fixation on underage, pubescent boys, such
fixation having heretofore so dominated his psyche as to
substantially impair and disrupt his life. 341
In general, current precedents, including two federal appellate
opinions, in favor of hebephilia, as admissible evidence in criminal cases
and a qualifying mental disorder for commitment purposes, mean that it
is likely to flourish in the law. 342 However, it appears an extremely poor
fit for legal decisions. Much evidence attests that hebephilia is
scientifically and normatively flawed: it is not based on empirical
evidence, no consistent diagnostic criteria exist for it, forensic experts are

337. Caporale, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55794, at *8 ; Hamelin, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 54790, at *8; Shea, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94182, at *12.
338. Caporale, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55794, at *16.
339. The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ sexual predator commitment program is
located at a facility in Butner, North Carolina. Derek Gilna, Federal Sex Offender Civil
Commitment Process Under Fire, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, August 2012, at 1, 7.
340. United States v. Caporale, No. 12-6832, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25014, at *22
(4th Cir. Dec. 6, 2012).
341. Id. at *22.
342. United States v. Cooke, No. 5:09-HC-02034-FL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
37051, at *17 (E.D.N.C. March 18, 2013) (overruling objection that hebephilia is not a
valid diagnosis); United States v. Antone, No. 5:07-HC-2042-FL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
137049, at *5, 8 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 25, 2012) (disagreeing with magistrate’s determination
that paraphilia NOS-nonconsent for hebephilia was not a valid diagnosis because even
though it is not specifically in the DSM, because the “term could conceivably be used to
describe a person with abnormal sexual arousal toward nonconsenting sexual
encounters.”).
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giving widely varying descriptions of its scope in case law, and interest
in pubescent and post-pubescent youth is not inherently deviant or
pathological. With the ambiguity in its ties to physical characteristics or
age, it might be a slippery slope toward incorporating even older
teenagers. The likelihood of many false positives is troubling. Further,
making the definition dependent on the legal age of consent represents an
unfortunate overlap between criminal law and psychiatric diagnosis. As
other commentators have appropriately warned, “prematurely
legitimizing another sexually dangerous mental disorder may further
contribute to the sexual panic now gripping the country, one in which
child molesters are more feared than terrorists.”343
C.

Rape as Mental Disease

Assertions of pretextuality and the merger of legal interests with
psychiatry are supported, too, in conceiving rape as a signifier of mental
disorder. Numerous cases exist where experts use rape as the proxy for
diagnosing mental disease. 344 Admittedly, several attempts have been
made over the years to specifically include rape as a paraphilia in the
DSM. Yet a specific rape-type paraphilia has been formally rejected
several times. 345 The latest attempt was to add what would have been
called paraphilic coercive disorder to DSM-5. Still, the working group
designated it as specifically reserved in text of the DSM-5 to be the
subject of continued formal review, which indicates the proposition
survives on.346 Experts continue to diagnose rape as indicating mental
disease and, as a recent empirical study of legal decisions shows, courts
are overwhelmingly receptive.347 Judicial opinions show state experts
giving various explanations for utilizing rape paraphilia despite the
343. Good & Burstein, supra note 316, at 493.
344. Sexual sadism is another potential diagnosis for rape but will not be addressed
in more detail here as it is far less frequently employed and has rarely been contested in
case decisions.
345. Thornton, supra note 66, at 412; Richard Wollert, Paraphilic Coercive
Disorder Does Not Belong in DSM-5 for Statistical, Historical, Conceptual, and
Practical Reasons, 40 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 1097 (2011).
346. Richard Balon, Controversies in the Diagnosis and Treatment of Paraphilias,
39 J. SEX & MARITAL THERAPY 7, 13 (2013).
347. Chris King et al., Forensic Usage of the Paraphilia NOS, Nonconsent
Diagnosis: A Case Law Survey, Presentation at the American Psychological-Law Society
Annual
Conference
(March
2012),
available
at
http://www.drexel.edu/~/media/Files/psychology/labs/heilbrun/presentations/APLS2012ParaphiliaNOSNonconsent.ashx.
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APA’s rejections. These include that the absence is due to feminists not
wanting to give rapists a tool to exonerate them, 348 feminist politics
conceptualizing rape as a violent crime and not a sex crime, 349 and a
more generic conclusion that this treatment is the result of social and
political pressures on the APA.350 Often they justify the diagnosis using
existing DSM language through the paraphilia NOS residual, with its
language regarding sexual behaviors involving nonconsenting persons.
Their argument is that victims of rape are by definition not consenting. 351
This version of rape paraphilia is commonly designated paraphilia NOSnonconsent.
1. Theoretical Rebuttals
There are several strong criticisms against specifically recognizing a
rape paraphilia. An empirical challenge is that such a diagnosis lacks any
evidence of reliability or validity.352 One reason may be that sexual
interest in the coercive aspect of the behavior is lacking. Studies fail to
support the idea that men who rape are aroused by the coerciveness per
se; rather, it appears that any coercion and aggression needed to achieve
the sexual encounter simply fail to inhibit males who are hypersexual,
antisocial, or lack an appreciation of the other person’s resistance. 353 At
the same time, there is evidence that many rapes are more about power
and control than sexual motivation. 354 A review of historical perspectives
on the reasons men rape uncovered evidence of five types of rapists:
(1) disadvantaged men who resort to rape, (2)
“specialized” rapists who are sexually aroused by violent
sex, (3) men who rape opportunistically, (4) highmating-effort men who are dominant and often
psychopathic, and (5) partner rapists motivated by
348. People v. Hardin, No. A119690, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3611, at *5
n.2 (Ct. App. May 6, 2009).
349. People v. Thomas, No. C035786, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11548, at *7
(Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2002).
350. People v. Dodele, No. A097675, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1458, at *2
n.2 (Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2003).
351. Thomas, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11548, at *3.
352. Wollert, supra note 345.
353. Raymond A. Knight, Is a Diagnostic Category for Paraphilic Coercive
Disorder Defensible?, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 419, 424 (2010).
354. Zander, supra note 303, at 461.
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assessments of increased risk of sperm competition. 355
Any presumption that rapists are mentally disordered is also belied
by the (unfortunate) frequency of sexual assaults. It has reasonably been
argued that the “number of nonconsensual sexual acts among
psychiatrically normal people suggests that this hypothesis is simply
social control dressed up as pop psychology.” 356
Others contend that formally accepting rape paraphilia specifically
in the DSM would signify the mental health community succumbing to
societal pressure rather than adhering to scientific principles. 357 Whether
expressly within the DSM or not, rape paraphilia diagnoses are driving
legal decisions across jurisdictions. 358 The result is a medicalization of
rape by reframing the crime of rape into mental illness. 359 And it appears
evident that the reason for reifying rape paraphilia is much less about
clinical concern and treatment as it is to serve criminal justice interests.
For example, a prosecutor who pursues sex offender civil commitment
(and is a member of the DSM-5 paraphilia working group) has argued in
favor of the APA formally recognizing a mental disorder to apply to
repeat rapists.360 He discounted criticism that a DSM diagnosis should
not be based solely on past behavior by pointing out that many DSM
disorders are applicable to prior criminal conduct. 361
2. Due Process Challenges
Despite significant empirical and theoretical challenges, courts
continue to reject legal challenges to evidence of a rape paraphilia. In the
apparently few cases in which defendants have sought Frye/Daubert
355. William F. McKibbin et al., Why Do Men Rape? An Evolutionary
Psychological Perspective, 12 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 86, 89 (2008).
356. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 208.
357. Zonana, supra note 258, at 249.
358. Conover v. Main, No. 11-632(PGS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36780, at *7 (D.
N.J. March 18, 2013); Sullivan v. Kramer, No. C 09-3690 RS (PIC), at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 26, 2012); In re Trulock, 970 N.E.2d 560, 566 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); In re J.E., No.
A-5297-08T2, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1120, at *8 (Ct. App. Div. May 22,
2012); People v. Welch, No. H035567, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2519, at *5 (Ct.
App. Apr. 3, 2012); In re Smallwood, No. A11-1971, 2012 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS
230, at *18-19 (Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2012).
359. Hinderliter, supra note 167, at 252; Moser & Kleinplatz, supra note 39, at 101.
360. Paul Stern, Paraphilic Coercive Disorder in the DSM: The Right Diagnosis for
the Right Reason, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 1443, 1444 (2010).
361. Id. at 1446.
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hearings to challenge its admissibility as a scientific or medical
construct, courts have rejected the need for such hearings. 362 Concerning
Frye, judges reason that Frye is focused on whether a new scientific
theory has achieved general acceptance. Since psychology as a science is
not novel and paraphilia diagnoses are standard psychological
applications, Frye is wholly inapplicable.363
Due process challenges to the inadequacy of a diagnosis of rape
paraphilia for the purpose of civil commitment proceedings have failed
in virtually every case.364 The basis of these challenges generally derives
from Supreme Court jurisprudence. In a 1992 case generally addressing
the constitutionality of civil commitment, the Court noted that the due
process clause protects at its core a liberty interest in being free from
bodily restraint imposed by arbitrary governmental action. 365 The Court
confirmed that civil commitment qualified as a significant deprivation of
that liberty interest.366 Nonetheless, in Kansas v. Hendricks,367 a case
about SVP civil commitment, the Supreme Court ruled that it intended to
leave much flexibility to states in what terminology and which qualifying
mental impairments were sufficient. However, a concurring opinion
recognized a potential constitutional impediment, surmising that if a
qualifying mental disorder or disability was “too imprecise a category to
offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is justified, our
precedents would not suffice to validate it.” 368 The Seventh Circuit
interpreted this potential constitutional challenge as follows:

362. In re Williams, No. 65436-5-1, 2012 Wash. App. LEXIS 1127, *14 (Ct. App.
May 14, 2012); In re Lopez, No. 40827-9-II, 2012 Wash. App. LEXIS 198, at *15-16
(Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2012).
363. Williams, 2012 App. LEXIS 1127, at *14; Lopez, 2012 Wash. App. LEXIS
198, at *15; In re Berry, 248 P.3d 592, 595 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); In re Williams, 264
P.3d 570, 575 n.11 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
364. E.g., Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 612 (7th Cir. 2010); Yancy v. Voss, No.
SACV 06-356-JFW(CW), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43880, at *44 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21,
2011); King v. Demorales, No. CV 08-4984-TJH (JEM), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126708,
at *62 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2010); In re Post, 187 P.3d 803, 817 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008); see
also Hoisington v. Williams, No. CV-07-332-LRS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93364, at *20
(E.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 2008) (explaining defendant had not referred to any cases in which
the diagnoses of paraphilias has not met general acceptance standards); In re Marrten,
No. 61923-3-I 2010 Wash. App. LEXIS 382, at *9 (Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2010).
365. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
366. Id.
367. 521 U.S. 346, 447 (1997).
368. Id. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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[A] medical diagnosis can be based on so little evidence
that bears on the controlling legal criteria that any
reliance upon it would be a violation of due process.
Therefore, a particular diagnosis may be so devoid of
content, or [of] so near-universal in its rejection by
mental health professionals, that a court’s reliance on it
to satisfy the “mental disorder” prong of the statutory
requirements for commitment would violate due
process.369
Detainees under sexual predator civil commitment have waged
constitutional challenges that rape paraphilia is too vague for substantive
due process purposes. These arguments have been slightly varied.
Defendants have argued that it is an invalid diagnosis 370 or too imprecise
as a qualifying disorder for due process purposes. 371 Similarly, other
defendants have challenged that the paraphilia for rape is not based on
sound scientific principles372 and not generally accepted.373 Others have
invoked the relevance of the partisan expert factions that have developed,
asserting that such a diagnosis was “only accepted by an extreme
minority primarily composed of state-employed professionals charged
with civil commitment evaluations.”374 One expert noted that it was a
“so-called ‘diagnosis’” used primarily by SVP evaluators and merely
“doublespeak for the crime of rape.” 375 Some litigants have justified their

369. McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 577 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
370. Id. at 577; Page v. California, No. 1:06-cv-01409, LJO DLB PC, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 72652, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2008); In re Lieberman, 929 N.E.2d 616,
631 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); In re Marrten, No. 61923-3-I, 2010 Wash. App. LEXIS 382, at
*1 (Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2010).
371. King, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126708, at *55; People v. Thomas, No.
C035786, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11548, at *30 (Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2002); see
also People v. Pedersen, No. A 115239, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9962, at *15 (Ct.
App. Dec. 11, 2007) (rejecting evidentiary challenge to paraphilia NOS as “meaningless”
and “unsupported”).
372. Brown, 599 F.3d at 610; In re Williams, 264 P.3d 570, 575 n.11 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2011); In re Post, 187 P.3d at 803, 817 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008); see also People v.
Cordero, No. B223215, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2780, at *8 (Ct. App. Apr. 15,
2011) (expert acknowledging “an inherently weak construct [without] without defined
criteria”).
373. Williams, 264 P.3d at 577 (claim procedurally defaulted); see also Marrten,
2010 Wash. App. LEXIS 382, at *8 (challenging construct as overbroad and imprecise
and not generally recognized in the psychiatric field).
374. McGee 593 F.3d at 578.
375. State v. McCuistion, 275 P.3d 1092, 1096 (Wash. 2012).
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due process argument on the failure of the DSM to include a paraphilia
specifically for rape.376 The defense in one federal case indicated its
omission from the DSM meant it psychiatrically did not exist, 377 while in
another case the defense argued its exclusion demonstrated the consensus
view in the profession that such a disorder is invalid and unreliable. 378
Federal courts have rejected such due process challenges. In
declining due process challenges to rape paraphilia, courts have often
pointed to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence suggesting much flexibility
in qualifying disorders for purposes of sex offender civil commitment. 379
For example, the Seventh Circuit in two separate cases rejected due
process challenges on the invalidity of rape paraphilia, drawing on
several quotations from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that
recognize differences between law and psychiatry: “the science of
psychiatry, which informs but does not control ultimate legal
determinations, is an ever-advancing science, whose distinctions do not
seek precisely to mirror those of the law.”380 Correspondingly, Hendricks
indicated that “[l]egal definitions . . . which must take into account such
issues and individual responsibility . . . and competency, need not mirror
those advanced by the medical profession.”381 Thus, “states must have
appropriate room to make practical, common-sense judgments” as to
what qualifies as mental conditions sufficient for civil commitment. 382
The Seventh Circuit ruled that these precedents signify that any
controversy as to whether a diagnosis can meet the legal standard for a
mental disorder is best resolved as an evidentiary question with cross
examination exposing the relevant strengths and weaknesses. 383

376. In re Berry, 248 P.3d 592, 596 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); see also King, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126708, at *59 (noting defendant’s contention paraphilia NOSnonconsent is a temporary diagnosis within the DSM).
377. Brown, 599 F.3d at 607.
378. McGee, 593 F.3d at 574.
379. McCuistion, 275 P.3d at 1103; King, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126708, at *61.
380. Brown, 599 F.3d at 611 (quoting Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002)).
381. Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997)); McGee, 593
F.3d at 569 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359); King, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126708,
at *61.
382. Brown, 599 F.3d at 611; McGee, 593 F.3d at 580.
383. McGee, 593 F.3d at 612.
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The debate as to whether rape paraphilia can be a valid diagnosis
under the DSM is also unpersuasive to state courts.384 Several courts
have explained that whether a disorder was explicitly contained in the
DSM or whether there was disagreement among professionals were not
dispositive issues, but simply factors to be considered by the trier of
fact.385 A recent Illinois case is particularly instructive as it included the
testimony of a professor of psychiatry at Johns Hopkins University
School of Medicine who had served as chair of certain APA workgroups
assigned to consider changes in the definitions of paraphilias in DSM-III
and DSM-IV. 386 At trial, the state offered two experts who, conceding
controversy about the diagnosis and that it was not specifically listed as a
disorder, testified that sufficient support existed within the DSM
paraphilia section’s criteria to warrant it.387 The Johns Hopkins professor,
testifying for the defense, stated that it was inappropriate to combine
paraphilia NOS with the separate diagnostic feature involving nonconsenting persons; moreover, he confirmed that the APA had expressly
rejected that diagnosis and there was no scientific support for it. 388
Despite the apparent significance of this expert’s testimony, the court
merely viewed it as reflecting a question of fact for the fact finder to
resolve in terms of judging the credibility of the conflicting expert
opinions.389 In concluding that express coverage in the DSM is not
dispositive, the court commented that “we cannot adopt any rule that
asks the DSM to . . . answer the ultimate legal questions or create a
perfect fit between law and medicine.”390
In several other cases, federal and state courts have evaded
evidentiary challenges to rape paraphilia by simple deference; that is,
simply recognizing that other courts accepted the diagnosis and
384. In re Lopez, No. 40827-9-II, 2012 Wash. App. LEXIS 198, at *17 (Ct. App.
Jan. 31, 2012); People v. Dacayana, No. B164664, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6871,
at *10 (Ct. App. July 22, 2004) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997))
(embracing the idea that medical and legal concepts are not synonymous and rape
paraphilia is acceptable).
385. People v. Pedersen, No. A115239, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9962, at
*17-18 (Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2007); In re A.M., 2010 ND 163, ¶ 19, 787 N.W.2d 752, 759
(2010); People v. Foster, No. B183315, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 568, at *15 (Ct.
App. Jan. 24, 2007); People v. Thomas, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11548, at *32-33
(Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2002).
386. In re Lieberman, 929 N.E.2d 616, 619–20 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
387. Id. at 631.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 632 (citing McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 576 (7th Cir. 2010)).
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permitting it.391 Another method of avoiding addressing legal challenges
has simply been to rule them procedurally defaulted when defendants
failed to object to the evidence at trial.392
Overall, the use of rape paraphilia per se and the use of the
polymorphous category of paraphilia NOS to provide a mental disorder
diagnosis for repeat rapists supports a thesis that mental health evaluators
are willing to expand diagnostic coverage for case adjudications. In the
face of significant flaws in the scientific, theoretical, and legal bases for
such a disorder, the proposition that the use of mental disorders to serve
prosecutorial interests is merely pretextual also appears to be supported.
The crime of rape becomes a proxy for mental disease.
D.

Ethical Considerations

The law-psychiatry interface here may do a disservice to the
independence and ethical values of both professions. Together, the
significant harm that sexual victimization causes, the monolithic fear of
the sexual predator, and the political clout behind SVP laws has
debilitated the assessment process.393 Systemically, concern for false
negatives overrides that of false positives. 394 Even those performing the
evaluations operate more from pessimism than optimism by being more
concerned with being wrong in not diagnosing paraphilia, and the
potential harms if wrong, rather than focusing on the likelihood of being
scientifically accurate.395
A critic has charged that American psychiatry as an institution has
been complicit in encouraging SVP laws with its “relentless and
extensive campaign to extend the scope and power of their influence in
the administration of justice, in the disposition of offenders, and in the
391. See, e.g., Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 2008); Yancy v. Voss,
No. SACV 06-356-JFW(CW), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43880, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21,
2011); King v. Demorales, No. CV 08-4984-TJH, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 126708, at *60–
61 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2010); Hoisington v. Williams, No. CV-07-332-LRS, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 93364, at *19 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 30. 2008); People v. O’Shell, 92 Cal. Rptr.
3d 57, 59 n.2 (2009); In re Post, 187 P.3d 803, 818 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
392. E.g., In re Williams, 264 P.3d 570, 577 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); In re Marrten,
No. 61923-3-I, 2010 Wash. App. LEXIS 382, at *9 (Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2010); In re
Cannon, No. 61841-5-I, 2009 Wash. App. LEXIS 1880, at *5 (Ct. App. July 27, 2009);
see also Page v. California, No. 1:06-cv-01409 LJO DLB PC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72652, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2008) (rejecting habeas as alternative remedy existed).
393. Prentky et al., supra note 27, at 360.
394. Id.
395. Wollert & Cramer, supra, note 257, at 563.
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policies and practices of correctional institutions and agencies.” 396 To be
fair, individual assessors are not likely acting on their own, as observers
note the “increasing tendency for experts to stretch or distort the
science—to introduce bad science—in response to the strong advocacy
pressures inherent in SVP proceedings.”397 The nature of the advocacy
process of the law itself invites bias, including forensic bias and
confirmatory bias. Forensic bias can occur through financial incentive, a
desire to please, empathizing with a litigant or retaining attorney, or
becoming involved in the adversarial process by steadfastly defending
one’s position in face of the cross examination.398 Confirmatory bias is
possible where one’s initial hypothesis or diagnosis is not reevaluated but
confirmed through the selective collection of supporting evidence. 399
Another avenue for bias is when the evaluator fails to independently
assess the individual, which occurs often in forensic evaluations of sex
offenders. A survey of evaluators in sex offender civil commitment
proceedings uncovered evidence which the authors indicate suggest that
many evaluators routinely rely upon a documented history of paraphilia
without independently assessing it.400 A commentator has warned that
mental health evaluators are on an ethical tightrope with “the pulling
forces of forensic identification and bias, personal and moral beliefs
about SVP legislation, and financial, personal, and reputation demands to
be allegiant to their retaining lawyers inherently may cause a nasty fall,
and ultimately they may have to choose one side or the other.”401
With respect to the application of SVP laws, the law’s utilization of
the disease model, with its referential use of mental disorders and the
need for psychiatric experts to provide such diagnoses, displeases several

396. Michael Hakeem, A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Crime and
Correction, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 650, 651 (1958).
397. Prentky et al., supra note 27, at 360.
398. Fabian, Paraphilias and Predators, supra note 264, at 94. Forensic
identification leads to bias when an assessor is influenced through inquiry by the
retaining expert. Forensic identification occurs through primacy and anchoring bias.
Primacy occurs with the initial case conceptualized by the potentially retaining attorney
who provides a theory which develops into the expert’s working hypothesis and expected
outcome. Anchoring bias occurs when the expert refuses to reverse initial impression
despite new or alternative information. Id. at 89.
399. Id. at 90; see also Prentky et al., Muddy Diagnostic Waters, supra note 265, at
456 (contending clinicians in SVP proceedings arrive at conclusions and then gather data
to justify a priori conclusions).
400. Jackson & Hess, supra note 137, at 440; see, e.g., State v. Ross, 873 A.2d 684,
661 (Conn. 2005) (diagnosis of sexual sadism based on other psychiatrists’ reports).
401. Fabian, Paraphilias and Predators, supra note 264, at 95.
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mental health professionals.402 A professor of psychiatry at Yale ruefully
challenges his colleagues as forensic specialists: “Our culture has
initiated a ‘war on sex offenders’ and the legal system has geared up to
wage it. Since we have made the diagnosis almost completely overlap
with the crime, we have become overly enmeshed with legal goals.” 403
The law-psychiatry interface here alarms some mental health
practitioners, too, in that shoehorning diagnoses to serve legal interests
impedes a focus on best practices in treating sex offenders and
preventing relapse. 404 “Psychiatry, unlike the law, does not regard these
patients as a homogeneous group of individuals who have simply
violated ‘bright-line’ boundaries dividing proscribed from permitted
sexual behaviors.”405 SVP laws were largely created with little attention
to these realities.406
From a philosophical perspective, to confuse legal and scientific
categories is to commit what some philosophers call the naturalistic
fallacy—i.e., thoughtlessly equating what is with what ought to be. 407 In
any event, there are calls for all participants in the legal process to make
substantive improvements. These include mental health experts focusing
on standardization and attempting to have greater transparency if
diagnosing paraphilia NOS in revealing their rationale. 408 Lawyers on
both sides should require more clarity about the diagnoses when
introduced in legal proceedings, 409 should improve their knowledge
about the scientific foundations of the evidence in order to wage legal
challenges, and should ask more probing questions to better assist the
trier of fact. Finally, judges should take a stronger stand by acting as
circumspect gatekeepers410 by reevaluating whether evidence of mental
disorders should be admissible, as legally relevant, under Frye/Daubert
expert evidence standards, and compatible with constitutional due
process considerations.
402. Kramer, supra note 241, at 234 (“Psychiatry is not a helping profession when
it takes an adversarial stance toward such patients and exacerbates rather than relieves
psychiatric symptoms.”).
403. Zonana, supra note 258, at 248.
404. Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 366.
405. Id. at 361.
406. Id.; see also Fabian, Paraphilias and Predators, supra note 264, at 83 (noting
the DSM was not created for the “application of behaviorally driven symptomatology to
answer legal questions”).
407. Prentky et al., supra note 27, at 359–60.
408. Frances et al., supra note 128, at 383.
409. Id.
410. See Prentky et al., Muddy Diagnostic Waters, supra note 265, at 458.
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Conclusions

Fear of sexual predators has led society to adopt a law-psychiatry
interface in which sexual offending is merged into a disease-based
philosophy to justify various forms of punishment and preventive
control. Sex crimes have become conflated with psychiatric disease. The
multiple concerns expressed herein strongly suggest that the use of the
psychiatric paraphilias in legal proceedings tends to undermine the
independence and integrity of the legal and psychiatric professions. For
the mental health field, the vagary of diagnostic criteria and the
significant discretion subsequently provided has led to inconsistent and
questionable diagnoses. The scientific requirements of validity and
reliability make the DSM paraphilias highly questionable even for
treatment purposes. For legal purposes, considering the significant
negative consequences that follow, they are a poor fit in the law. The
widespread acceptance of mental disorders for sexual deviance, despite
these substantial scientific problems, ignores significant issues of due
process and equity considering they help dictate infringements on
fundamental interests of defendants.
Unfortunately, it appears that law and psychiatry will remain
complicit in adapting diagnoses of mental illness to criminal justice
officials’ desire to control sex offenders. Academics and practitioners
have sought the removal of the paraphilias from the DSM because
labeling sexual behaviors as pathological has done great harm to many
defendants.411 However, it is also recognized that removing the
paraphilias, most particularly pedophilia, would be a public relations
disaster for psychiatry.412 The APA’s continuing involvement is evident
with the overuse of paraphilia NOS, for example, and its ongoing
consideration of adopting new paraphilias, such as rape paraphilia and
hebephilia, that serve prosecutorial interests. The law’s entrenchment is
likewise strong, including the repeated acceptance in judicial decisions
favorably embracing mental disease for sexual deviance—even those not
otherwise specified—threatens to permit more shoehorning diagnoses to
satisfy criminal justice goals. The collaboration threatens not only the
liberty and privacy interests of those who commit sex-based offenses.
The potential exists for a contagion effect whereby interest groups might
be encouraged to qualify all manner of criminal behaviors as distinct
411. Moser & Kleinplatz, supra note 39, at 107.
412. Robert L. Spitzer, Sexual and Gender Identify Disorders: Discussion of
Questions for DSM-V, 17 J. PSYCHOL. & HUM. SEXUALITY 111, 115 (2005).
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mental disorders.413 Accordingly, if the interaction between law and
psychiatry continues in this manner, all criminals may be deemed to have
mental disorders. This outcome makes no logical sense, undermines the
core tenets of the law, infringes upon fundamental rights, and
methodically destroys trust in the science of psychiatry.

413. Zonana, supra note 258, at 246.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/2

64

